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The Shape of Things

THE WAR WITH JAPAN IS FORTY-EIGHT hours old as we go to press, and with operations ranging over a huge area it is not surprising that rumors should be more plentiful than confirmed news. Thanks to slavish and treacherous imitation of German blitz tactics, the Japanese have scored some important successes, though they are probably indulging in wishful thinking when they claim to have reduced the American Pacific fleet to parity with their own. One of their main objectives has been to cripple our air forces with a view to postponing as long as possible the aerial counter-offensive which is, perhaps, their greatest dread. They seem to have caused severe damage to airfields in Hawaii and have probably destroyed a good many planes there. A heavy onslaught is now being directed against our air forces in the Philippines from a number of Japanese air bases. The distance from Manila to Japan itself probably precludes American raids on Tokyo from that point, but air attacks on the important Japanese military centers in Formosa and Hainan would be practicable; hence the Japanese attempt to destroy our Philippine air power. Operations against the British have been mainly directed against Singapore and the Malayan Peninsula, where small numbers of troops have been landed and are being mopped up. The quick collapse of Thailand offers a new threat both to Malaya and Burma. The British are well prepared, however, and in general seem to have been rather more alert than we were. We have still to learn that in dealing with the Axis we must always expect the unexpected.

*

IF THE JAPANESE HAD SET OUT ON THEIR great adventure with the express purpose of making our isolationists look ludicrous, they could hardly have chosen a better plan of attack. How many times have the ears of the American people been assailed by the mocking tones of the Wheelers, the Lindberghs, and the Nyes, rhetorically asking how we could be attacked across 3,000 miles of ocean when the Nazis couldn't even cross 20 miles of Channel. Now that an Axis fleet has crossed 3,500 miles of ocean and attacked, not a defenseless city, but the most powerful naval base in the world, the isola-

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tionist rush for the bandwagon is in full swing. Senator Wheeler is all for "licking hell out of them" with soldiers he didn't want trained and a morale he did his best to destroy. Hamilton Fish is sounding reveille so shrilly that no one can hear the small voice of the grand jury that has been begging him for weeks to testify concerning the use of his frank by the worst Axis agents in America. The Oracle of Royal Oak and his lesser imitators have wrapped themselves in the silence that befits prophets at work on a new revelation, and a similar reticence has seized upon the bitter-end pacifists. These individuals who never spared the vitriol in their exposures of the President's "warmongering" do not even intimate that they were wrong: that they dangerously misled their followers. It is the Japanese, they say, who are mad. Only Senator Nye moves along his appointed way without pausing to polish up his brass. Japan's attack in the Pacific, he explains, is "just what Britain had planned for us." Whatever course these gentry may eventually take, we hope the Administration will not, in the name of unity, give them posts of responsibility in the war effort. France tried that with some of its appeasers, and now, long after France has died, they are still riding high.

*

BRITAIN HAS DECLARED WAR ON FINLAND, Hungary, and Rumania following the rejection by the governments of these countries of demands that they cease from participation in Germany's war against Russia. Hungary and Rumania are so clearly and completely under Hitler's thumb and so isolated geographically from the West that their negative answers were foregone conclusions. But there had been a faint hope that Finland retained enough independence and democratic spirit to make possible its withdrawal from the unnatural Nazi alliance. With the abandonment by the Russians of the port of Hangoe, the Finns had rewon all their lost territories. But now their leaders declare that they must go on until they have captured the bases from which Russia attacked Finland in 1939. In other words, they are intent on pursuing that fata morgana, a strategic frontier. Regardless of excuses, the fact is that Finland is aiding Germany in waging aggressive war against Russia, and since war is indivisible Finland is also fighting against Britain and the United States. In particular, by its advance against the Murmansk railroad and toward the White Sea it is threatening one of the important lines of communication between Russia and the West. Britain's declaration of war against Finland and the two other Axis puppet states may not have much immediate effect since diplomatic ties were broken months ago. It will, however, strengthen the elements inside those countries which oppose their governments' policies. Among the Finns and Hungarians, especially, friendship for Britain has been traditional, and their marked lack of enthusiasm for the Nazi alliance is not likely to be changed by the knowledge that when peace comes they will be forced to sit on the Axis side of the table.

*

THE ANNOUNCEMENT THAT TURKEY HAS been receiving lend-lease supplies from the United States for the last six months was appropriately timed to coincide with reports of increased Nazi pressure on that country. Although the Germans must obviously stabilize their fronts in Libya and southern Russia before they can consider a move against Turkey, there are, from Hitler's point of view, big advantages to be gained from such a move. Turkey stands in the way of two of Hitler's most important objectives—oil and control of the Suez Canal. The defeat at Rostov probably precludes a drive on the Caucasus this winter, and Hitler may well reason that a drive on the oil fields of Baku, Iraq, or Iran by way of Turkey would in the long run be less costly than an attempt to reach these fields via Russia. Unquestionably, Hitler would prefer to attain these objectives by diplomatic rather than by military means. But pressure tactics against Ankara have so far proved fruitless, and there seems little reason to doubt that with the prospect of continued American and British support Turkey will fight rather than follow the example of Rumania and Bulgaria.

*

THE RELEASE OF JAWAHARLAL NEHRU AND 500 other members of the All-India Congress Party from prison may well be the first step toward a solution of the knotty Indian problem. Although Gandhi has declared that the government's action has not evoked "a single responsive, appreciative chord" in him, there is reason to believe that the Congress Party as a whole may be prepared to compromise on the question of the war if the British government sufficiently demonstrates its good faith. As long as Nehru and Abul Kalam Azad, president of the Congress, were in prison, no negotiations looking toward a settlement of the situation were possible. Resentment was especially widespread against the harsh sentence given to Nehru. Having obtained the release of their leaders, a considerable section of the Congress Party is believed to be ready to cooperate once again in the Indian government, even though cooperation means support of the war effort. To this the pacifist Gandhi is strongly opposed, and up to now the Congress Party has never taken an important action which did not have the sanction of Gandhi. Britain, however, could probably reach an agreement with the majority of Congress if it genuinely prepared to carry out its promise of dominion status for India. Only thus can the wholehearted support of the Indian people be secured for the democratic cause. And with Japan's entry into the arena that support becomes more essential than ever.

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ITALY'S SECRET POLICE HAS DISCOVERED a plot to kill Mussolini in 1938 and overthrow the government in 1929. If the tenses are confused, so are the charges. Among the plotters are said to be Yugoslav irredentists, "demo-liberals" in government employ, Communists, and a young man whose girl had tuberculosis. This interesting group had a good-sized arsenal, several newspapers, and an efficient apparatus for espionage and sabotage. No one, of course, can believe the story as the Italian government has given it out; it resembles the Moscow trials a bit too closely, and as the New York *Times* says, the Ovra may well have been stupid all these years, but where on earth was the Italian office of the Gestapo? Behind the fantastic Trieste trial there is probably another story which the Italians are trying to conceal by prosecuting the "demo-liberals." Reports of genuine and current disaffection with the regime have been frequent during the past few months, and the latest issue of *Free World* produces some stirring evidence. The editors received from an Alpine village on the Italian border a manifesto of freedom written by representatives of several anti-fascist groups. It calls for an end of the alliance with Hitler, a separate peace with the allied powers, and the ousting from Italy of both Hitler and Mussolini. This document was widely circulated before the Trieste star chamber was open for business, and from all reports it was warmly received. It is more than possible that this manifesto and other evidences of discontent led Il Duce to contrive his small, self-frustrated plot to discourage future demonstrations against the regime and at the same time to make it seem that enmity to the regime ceased years ago.

*

AT ANY OTHER TIME THE SETTLEMENT OF the captive-mines dispute in favor of the union would have been an event of considerable political significance. The arbitration board, however, did not announce its decision until five hours after Japanese planes bombed Hawaii, and the controversy that had been the biggest news in the country two weeks ago got little notice in the press. There could be no more suitable ending to the whole episode. The miners and their union got what they justly asked for, but John L. Lewis, who has been playing to the grandstands since the beginning, found himself overshadowed by a war in his few moments of triumph. It is unlikely that he will gain anything in terms of political prestige or personal publicity. As for the public, it can be assured of uninterrupted production, and it need no longer be distracted by anything so far off the main issue. We can only hope now that the war will sober Congress and force it to scrap the rash and bitter anti-labor legislation that was well on its way to passage last week. Is it too much to expect, in this hour of crisis, that neither pointless strikes nor vindictive legislation will be allowed to obstruct national unity?

CHICAGO NEWSPAPER READERS HAVE FOR so long had to content themselves with a drop of poison to each stick of type that the coming of Marshall Field's *Sun* is a matter of congratulation even in a week of catastrophe. The Chicago *Tribune,* most rabidly isolationist daily in the country, is already in there shouting for my-country-right-or-wrong, but that scarcely lessens the value of having a sane, honest paper, committed editorially to the position that "the best interests of Chicago, of the Midwest, and of America can best be served . . . by the complete defeat of Adolf Hitler and everything he stands for." The Chicago *Sun* has got off to a splendid start, and we, along with thousands of others, wish it a long life and a useful one.

Fruits of Appeasement

BY FREDA KIRCHWEY

AND so at the last the fruits of appeasement have been harvested; the ripe fruits have fallen—and burst—in Pacific harbors bearing strange yet familiar names, on the decks of American ships, in the streets of tropical island towns filled with astonished people; black and filled with poisonous seed, the fruits of appeasement have burst, and the dead have not yet been counted and named.

The horror has made America one. Today we love each other and our country. We feel a happy sense of union swelling in our hearts; hatred and contempt for our enemy runs warmly in our blood. We are one—all of us. Senator Wheeler and Cordell Hull and you and I and our sons; we are all ready to fight the enemy that sneaked up under cover of a diplomatic flag of truce and dropped the bombs on our ships and in our streets. We feel our strength and our virtue. We know ourselves to be honorable, peaceable, unaggressive, generous, conciliatory. We pat ourselves on the back. We contrast our virtues with the hateful, sneaking brutality of our enemy. "While America was doing its best to preserve peace in the Pacific," we say, in fine sonorous editorials, "the cowardly enemy struck." "At the very moment when Mr. Hull was receiving the reply of the Japanese government," we say, over the air, in the Congress, to one another, "at that very moment bombs were being dropped into Pearl Harbor and on the airfields of the Philippines." How fine it sounds. Has forbearance ever met so fiendish a recompense? When? Where?

Only in Prague; only in Oslo and Narvik; only in Rotterdam; only in every country of the world where men have chosen the way of surrender to ruthless aggression rather than the way of courage and resistance. At the moment a nation decides that the dictator-aggressor can be bargained with, bought off with promises, at

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the moment it decides to pay just a little blackmail—a few tons of oil, a few shiploads of wheat or tin or scrap—at that moment it hands the decision to the enemy. From then on the enemy holds the cards. He may overplay his hand as Hitler did; as Japan has done this week. He may ask for more than he can collect. But even if he has to fight in the end, he will fight on his own terms and at his own convenience. He will pick the hour and drop his bombs where he pleases. On the American warships in Pearl Harbor, for example.

This horror could have been avoided if we had refused from the hour of Japan's first invasion of Manchoukuo to feed it the oil and machines and metals and planes with which it extended its conquests year by year. It could have been avoided if we had lived up to our proclaimed principles after the invasion of China in 1937, or even if we had said our final, fatally delayed No at the time Japan signed the Axis pact. But since we failed at each moment of decision to do more than preach, since Japan was encouraged to believe its full ambitions could be achieved without fighting, since we began to implement our principles only when those ambitions ran head-on into the major strategic and economic interests of the British and ourselves, the horror came. And with it, in spite of the procrastination and cowardice that produced it, came a new opportunity for courage and clearsighted action. The bombs that fell on Hawaii and the Philippines and all the suffering that now will follow can be counted worth their cost if the nation learns at last what this war means and how it must be fought.

Will it learn? The self-righteous mood with which we are meeting the challenge may well cause some misgivings. We are too pleased with ourselves, too happy in our new-found unity. But war is an ugly business, a long agony. It is well, perhaps, that we are going into it with high hearts; well, even, that our brains aren't working too efficiently. For the moment we may allow ourselves the full exuberant expression of our traditional and youthful belligerence. But soon, before this mood has hardened, we must learn what Britain has only slowly learned since the spring of 1940—that this war is not merely a brutal aggression, treacherous and unprovoked, but is the penalty for our old sins against the democratic faith. Our long appeasement of Japan brought on this war, but so did our sell-out of Spain, our futile bargaining with Franco and Pétain. Each is part of a whole—and the whole is the betrayal of the anti-fascist front against aggression and terrorism and tyranny. And the final cost of that betrayal is yet to be met. The war with Japan is only the beginning.

Whether we realize it fully or not, we are now in the World War—not in an isolationist Pacific war. We are fighting Hitler's ally, whose imperialist aims are merely an item in the program of fascist world domination, whose treacherous attack on us is merely the start of a major new campaign in Hitler's total war.

How shall we face the destiny we have dodged so long? Shall we profit by the series of mistakes that brought us to this terrible decision, or are we going to fix our minds on Tokyo and Manila and our own Pacific coast—and wait? Wait till the enemy makes his next move at his own convenience: till he takes Dakar (does Dakar seem as far from South America this week as it did last?); till he takes the Canaries and the Balearics; till he moves through Spain and Portugal. Shall we go on hoping that when Hitler again strikes westward, Vichy will be neutral—Vichy which just the other day gave its cringing approval to Japan's new troop concentrations in Indo-China? Shall we go on hoping that Madrid will be neutral—though last week at the anti-Comintern meeting in Berlin Spain's Foreign Minister delivered a more vicious attack on the United States than even the Japanese war-makers had risked? Shall we go on with the policies that first precipitated Hitler's world war and then permitted it to be waged on his terms? Or can we bring into the struggle a new clarity of purpose, new understanding of the issues, new initiative and militancy? The fate of the United States and of Western civilization depends on our answer to those questions.

Our Grand Strategy

THIS war is indivisible, and our most urgent need is to develop a grand strategy, taking into account the fact that our battle with Japan is not separate from the conflict which has been raging across the world for two years but part and parcel of an all-out totalitarian bid for world domination. The Japanese would never have begun this war if Hitler had not won such signal successes in Europe; their only hope of averting a disastrous finish depends on the defeat by Germany of Britain and Russia. And contrariwise, if we lick the hell out of Japan but allow Britain to fall, we shall have merely exchanged a Japanese threat to our security for a much more serious German one.

Our plans must be based on these facts whether or not we become formally engaged in war with Germany and Italy. In allocating supplies, in deciding how to dispose to the best advantage our ships and men we must constantly keep in mind the situation in Europe as well as that in the Far East. Now that our Pacific gateway is endangered it is more necessary than ever to guard our Atlantic approaches, and that means the continued provisioning of the British island fortress.

It is inconceivable that Japan would have taken the plunge into war without encouragement and assurances

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from Germany the nature of which we shall probably learn before long. Since September, 1939, and especially in the past year, Japan has rendered valuable services to Hitler because of its high nuisance value in keeping immobilized British and allied forces in the Far East. What has happened to make Japan seem still more valuable as a belligerent member of the Axis even though its emergence in that role involved the disadvantage of bringing the United States into the war? One thing, we suspect, is that the Battle of the Atlantic has been going badly for Hitler, making the diversion of American naval strength from the waters around Iceland a matter of urgency. Another, perhaps, is that British aggressiveness in the Mediterranean has all but immobilized the remains of the Italian fleet and placed Axis forces in North Africa in an inextricable position despite temporary success by General Rommel's panzers. A third reason is the failure of the German campaign in Russia, a failure acknowledged by the official German announcement that the onslaught on Moscow was being abandoned until spring. Even if Russia does not at once declare war on Japan, war in the Far East means that the Soviet garrisons in eastern Siberia will have to be maintained and possibly reinforced.

We have already suggested that Hitler must have given Japan concrete promises of aid. We would expect this to take the form of renewed aerial assaults on Britain's shores and home waters and on the British fleet and bases in the Mediterranean. It also seems likely that the negotiations between Berlin and Vichy for the use of the French navy and bases will be pushed to a rapid conclusion with a view to bringing total Axis sea power somewhat nearer to parity with that of America and Britain. Another possibility is the mobilization in this country of the German fifth column for active sabotage duties, especially now that it can no longer find a useful outlet for its energy in supporting isolationist movements.

We must be ready to counter such moves by Germany and be prepared too for a drive by the *Reichswehr* toward the Caucasus and India which would aim at providing a direct link with Japan. For one of the weaknesses of the Axis is the lack of any direct connection between its eastern and western wings. We should at all costs see to it that this weakness is not remedied, and that may mean sacrifices to keep Russia armed and fighting.

We have yet to learn the extent of our initial naval losses incurred through the treacherous Japanese attacks on Pearl Harbor and the Philippines. There is reason to fear that they may have been heavy, and some depletion of the Atlantic fleet for the benefit of Pacific defense may be essential. But compensation could be provided by fuller coordination between our Atlantic squadrons and those of Britain, with provision for unified command. We must remember that retention of Singapore will be a vital element in our conquest of Japan and that we cannot afford to have Britain's Far Eastern forces weakened by demands for reinforcement of its home waters.

The defense of our Pacific shores against Japanese aggression—apart from hit-and-run raids—is a comparatively simple problem. The destruction of the Japanese fleet, which must be our primary aim, is quite a different matter. Between Pearl Harbor and Japan are thousands of miles of ocean studded with strongly fortified Japanese bases which must be neutralized before we can safely approach Asiatic shores. Neither we nor the British have air bases close enough to the heart of Japan to make raiding effective, while the Japanese can take off from half a dozen points to raid our Eastern strongholds. The one point from which Tokyo and other Japanese cities are really vulnerable is Vladivostok.

We need the assistance of Russian forces based on that city. But Russia has yet to declare itself in respect to the Far Eastern segment of the World War. We have the right to ask for Soviet aid, but Russia, hard-pressed as it is by Germany, may hesitate to commit itself to war with Japan unless assured that in return for alliance in the East we will become a full ally in the West. It is a step we should no longer hesitate to take. The combined manpower and economic capacity of the countries fighting the Axis are vastly superior to those of their enemies. But if those resources are to be coordinated for maximum effectiveness we must realize that this war is indivisible and decide our strategy accordingly.

Japan's Achilles Heel

THE strength of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor seems difficult to reconcile, at first thought, with the frequently repeated facts regarding Japan's basic economic weakness. But it must be remembered that the blow had obviously been planned for months and was merely a rash display of Japan's known naval power. Wars of the type now starting between the United States and Japan are not won by a dazzling show of strength in the first few hours but by military power developed over a period of months or possibly years. And on this basis Japan is not only weak but is markedly weaker today than it was a year ago.

Prior to its attack on China in 1937, Japan was at best a second-rate industrial power. In recent years it has left no stone unturned in the effort to develop its heavy industry as a basis for its program of military expansion. The equipment of the Japanese army has been completely overhauled in accordance with the requirements of motorized, two-dimensional warfare. But this has been achieved at a tremendous sacrifice of Japan's basic economic strength. Until the past few years, for example, Japan was approximately self-sufficient in basic foodstuffs. But Japanese agriculture was largely dependent on phosphate

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fertilizer which had to be imported from the United States and North Africa. Inadequate imports of this fertilizer in the past two years, because of the necessity of laying in war supplies, are responsible for the fact that Japan's 1941 rice crop fell 20 per cent below the planned level and was lower than in any other recent year. The Japanese fish catch has been similarly reduced by lack of supplies normally imported from abroad.

Recent years have seen a chronic shortage of coal and steel even for the armament industries. Steel production early in 1941 averaged about 15 per cent below the 1940 level. Ship repairs have been held up in recent months by the lack of steel. Japan's output of brass has been halved. The industries producing civilian goods have, of course, been even more drastically curtailed.

A glance at Japan's budget figures will indicate how close that country is to its military capacity. The most recent Japanese budget calls for expenditures of approximately $3,500,000,000, more than half of which is for war purposes. The war in China is costing a billion a year. Japan's national income is between $6,000,000,000 and $7,000,000,000. Experience in other, more prosperous, countries shows that the government can claim as much as two-thirds of the national income, but only for a limited time. So it is apparent that Japan is already expending close to the maximum on war production. A further increase of half a billion a year for a brief period is conceivable, but when it is recalled that American armament expenditures are already in excess of $1,500,000,000 a *month,* it is apparent that the Japanese may soon have on their hands more of a war than they bargained for.

The Issues at Minneapolis

DECEMBER 15 is the 150th anniversary of the adoption of the Bill of Rights. We can think of no better way to celebrate it than by calling attention to the Minneapolis sedition trial. The prosecution of twenty-three Trotskyists for sedition and the conviction of eighteen of them on charges of conspiracy to create insubordination in the armed forces are challenges to every believer in civil liberties. They are an example of the very thing the Bill of Rights sought to make impossible—the imprisonment of men not for what they did but for what they thought and said.

Two aspects of the prosecution are of the greatest importance. The first is that the government contended that it did not need to wait for an "overt act" but could penalize the expression of opinions that might some day lead to overt acts. The second is that Assistant Attorney General Henry Schweinhaut, who is supposed to be a great champion of civil liberties, expressly disclaimed any intention on the part of the government to be bound by the Holmes-Brandeis theory of "clear and present danger." This concept, developed in a series of dissents by the two great liberal jurists, holds that the expression of opinion may be prosecuted if there is a "clear and present danger" that it will lead to an overt act.

Though Holmes and Brandeis are often invoked by the Department of Justice and Attorney General Francis Biddle, their guiding principles, as often happens with the celebrated dead, are overlooked and evaded. Schweinhaut declared that the government was proceeding on the basis of conservative minority opinions of the Supreme Court which permit prosecution of opinion. Obviously the tiny Socialist Workers' Party is no threat either to established government or to the loyalty of the army. Any attempt to proceed against it on the basis of what it is doing today must fall flat. Schweinhaut argued that the Bolshevik Party in Russia was also a tiny minority before the revolution. His argument reduced itself to the proposition that the Socialist Workers' Party, though tiny too, might also make a revolution.

The assumptions implicit in this view should hardly need to be driven home again at this late date. The idea that revolutions are brought about by dangerous men and dangerous thoughts is a familiar one in Japan. We ought to be careful that it is not naturalized here. There was revolution in czarist Russia, not because of the tiny Bolshevik Party, but because long-standing oppression and the corruption and military defeat of czarism disgusted and alienated the great mass of the people. It is in the correction of abuses and not in the suppression of revolutionary opinions that the safety of any social order lies. Were it otherwise, czarism, with its Siberian prisons for revolutionaries, would still be a going concern. We are ashamed to have to repeat these truisms now.

We believe that the precedents established by this conviction are dangerous to freedom of thought and expression in America. We believe that they open the door to the possible prosecution of other trade-union leaders on the ground that they belong to a "revolutionary" party. We believe this case all the more dangerous because the Department of Justice has picked a tiny unpopular minority as its legal-laboratory specimen in the experiment of grafting foreign ideas on American law. We believe that all progressives of whatever political orientation must join in the defense of the Minneapolis defendants or permit the establishment of a precedent that may some day be used against any of them.

These fears may seem exaggerated. They are much less exaggerated than the fears which led the common people of one state after another at the time of the ratification of the Constitution to demand its amendment by a Bill of Rights. Learned and legally conclusive arguments were brought forward to prove that these fears were unfounded, but experience has shown the wisdom in that clamor. Liberty is most easily preserved when the threat to it is small. Then is the time to act, and that time is now.

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War Comes to Washington

BY I. F. STONE

Washington, December 8

I FIRST heard the news from the elevator man in the National Press Building. The ticker at the Press Club, normally shut off on Sunday, carried the first flash telling of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. It was a beautiful late-autumn Sunday, the sky clear and the air crisp. At the entrance to the White House a small crowd had gathered to watch Cabinet members arrive. In the reporters' room inside, a group was clustered around the radio. I talked to Ambassador Hu Shih by telephone, and he said he felt "really sad" and sounded as though he meant it. The Navy Department seemed busy but calm; the War Department less so. Soldiers in helmets, carrying guns with fixed bayonets, guarded the entrance to the War Department's half of the huge old Munitions Building. They looked awkward and uncomfortable.

The public-relations office of the War Department refused a request for background material on the comparative military strength of the United States and Japan on the ground that since four o'clock that afternoon all information on the composition and movement of troops abroad had been declared a secret. The Navy Department, less strict, was still giving out information already "on the record," thus saving reporters a trip to the Library of Congress. In the Navy Department reference room women employees, hastily summoned from their homes, sent out for sandwiches and coffee and joked about Japanese bombers. There as elsewhere one encountered a sense of excitement, of adventure, and of relief that a long-expected storm had finally broken. No one showed much indignation. As for the newspapermen, myself included, we all acted a little like firemen at a three-alarmer.

The first press release from the State Department spluttered. It said the Secretary of State had handed the Japanese representatives a document on November 26 stating American policy in the Far East and suggestions for a settlement. A reply had been handed the Secretary of State that afternoon. The release declared that Secretary Hull had read the reply and immediately turned to the Japanese Ambassador and with the greatest indignation said: ". . . I have never seen a document that was more crowded with infamous falsehoods and distortions—infamous falsehoods and distortions on a scale so huge that I never imagined until today that any government on this planet was capable of uttering them." I asked several other reporters at the State Department just what the Japanese had told Secretary Hull to make him so angry. Nobody seemed to know, and the release did not explain. Hull's language was later described by one reporter as being "as biting if not as deadly as his fellow-mountaineer Sergeant York's bullets." It is a long time since Secretary Hull was a mountaineer.

The Japanese memorandum, released later, made it easier to understand the Secretary's stilted indignation. One has to go back to Will Irwin's "Letters of a Japanese Schoolboy" to match this memorandum. "Ever since China Affair broke out owing to the failure on the part of China to comprehend Japan's true intentions," said one of the more humorous passages, "the Japanese government has striven for the restoration of peace, and it has consistently exerted its best efforts to prevent the extension of war-like disturbances. It was also to that end that in September last year Japan concluded the Tripartite Pact with Germany and Italy." The memorandum indicates only the vaguest shadow of any American intention to appease Japan. At one time the President seems to have offered to "introduce" peace between Japan and China and then—I suspect after the visit to the White House of Hu Shih and T. V. Soong—withdrawn it. But the kind of peace the President might have "introduced" could hardly have been to Japan's liking, though the idea may have made the Chinese uneasy. The Japanese memorandum accuses our own government of "holding fast to theories in disregard of realities," of trying to force "a utopian ideal" on the Japanese, and of "refusing to yield an inch on its impractical principles." I hope these compliments were fully deserved.

The proposals made by Secretary Hull in his letter of November 26 were so obviously unacceptable to a government like Japan's that one wonders why we negotiated at all. Japan was to withdraw all its troops from China and not to support any other government there except "the National Government . . . with capital temporarily at Chungking." Our War Department is said to have asked the White House for three more months in which to prepare, and it may be that the Japanese were also anxious to delay a crisis. It is suspected in some quarters here that the attack on Pearl Harbor was the work of a minority in Japan fearful of further "stalling." The attack came before the Emperor could reply to the President's personal appeal for peace. If it forced the hand of the Japanese government, it also succeeded in uniting our own country behind Mr. Roose-

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velt. The reactions of the isolationist press and of Senators like Wheeler are indicative. If Mr. Roosevelt leaned too far in one direction to please the anti-appeasement and pro-war faction, his tactics served to prove to the other side that he had done all in his power to avoid war, that war was forced upon him. Lincoln in the same way hesitated and compromised and sought to "appease" before war came.

We are going into this war lightly, but I have a feeling that it will weigh heavily upon us all before we are through. The vast theater on which the struggle between this country and Japan opens makes the last war seem a parochial conflict confined to the Atlantic and the western cape of the Eurasian continent. This is really world war, and in my humble opinion it was unavoidable and is better fought now when we still have allies left. It is hoped here that the actual coming of war may serve to speed up the pace of production and shake both capital and labor out of a business-as-usual mood far too prevalent. There has been a general feeling that the production problem could not be solved until war was declared. We shall see. It is possible that a whipped-up hysteria against labor and progressives will serve to stifle the very forces that could be used to bring about an "all-out" effort. It is also possible that the coming of war will open the way to greater cooperation in the defense program, to a broader role for labor in the mobilization of industry, to a lessening of attacks on labor in Congress, and to improved morale.

My own confidence springs from a deep confidence in the President. For all his mistakes—and perhaps some of them have only seemed mistakes—he can be counted on to turn up in the end on the democratic and progressive side. I hate to think of what we should do without him, and when I drive down to work early in the morning past the White House I cannot help thinking with sympathy of the burdens that weigh him down. On the threshold of war, and perhaps ultimately social earthquake, we may be grateful that our country has his leadership.

*British Unions and the Law**

IT IS a commonplace that war as now practiced is a highly capitalized industry. Modern battles are won or lost not only by the fighting forces but in mines, steel mills, and machine shops. The characteristic phenomenon of today is not the nation in arms; it is the nation making arms. No Englishman who lived through the months after Dunkirk when the cry was "give us weapons" is likely to forget that truth.

Military technique from the day of the longbow to that of the tank has always had social roots. Under present conditions the discipline and morale of the workshop, though different in character from the discipline and morale of the services, are equally decisive for victory or defeat. The relations of a government bent on the maximum utilization of productive resources to workers' professional associations is of vital importance to all countries which have not, like Nazi Germany, disposed of the problem by the simple expedient of abolishing trade unions and killing or imprisoning active trade unionists.

Are special restrictions on trade-union activity desirable in war time? If so, what forms should they take? Every nation must answer those questions for itself, as its own circumstances and genius dictate. In the debates on the subject now occurring in America, however, references are made periodically to the British experience. It may be worth while, therefore, to describe the main features of the situation in Great Britain, not in order to provide an example for imitation, but with the humbler object of clearing the ground of needless misconceptions

* The author of this article is a British economist who prefers to have his name withheld.

LEGALIZATION

British trade-union law is a jungle in which lawyers as well as laymen, have more than once lost their way It would be inhuman to attempt to lead the reade through every winding of the maze; but one preliminar fact may be recalled, since it offers a clue to much sub sequent history. It is that whereas in a score or so o countries before the present war freedom of associatio was the subject of constitutional guaranties, British trad unions entered the nineteenth century as "unlawful com binations" and even after their statutory prohibition wa repealed continued to be affected by a strong taint c illegality. Special legislation was required to legaliz them; legislation was subject to judicial interpretatior judge-made law required the renewed intervention c Parliament, in order to correct it. Cases in point ar the Trade Disputes Act of 1906, restoring to unior rights which they supposed had been secured the by the legislation of the seventies but which had bee subsequently undermined by the courts, and the Trac Union Act of 1913. Both have since been qualifie in certain important respects by the last major piece c legislation, the Trade Disputes and Trade Unions A

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of 1927. Of Section 4 of that act, which deals with the political activities of unions, something is said below. Section 5 prohibits civil servants from being members of an organization whose membership is not confined to persons employed by the Crown, which is affiliated to any such organization, or whose objectives include political objectives. Sections 1 to 3 declare that a strike or lockout is illegal if it "has any object other than or in addition to the furtherance of a trade dispute within the trade or industry in which the strikers [or employers] are engaged," and also is "designed or calculated to coerce the government either directly or by inflicting hardship upon the community." The purpose of these sections was to prevent—though the expressions do not occur in the act—what are commonly called "sympathetic strikes" and "general strikes"; and a good deal might be said about them. So far as the writer is aware, however, no cases arising from them have yet come before the courts. Until they have been the subject of judicial interpretation, their effect, as distinct from their intention, remains uncertain.

Apart from the Act of 1927, the repeal or amendment of which continues to be demanded, the present condition of British trade-union law is not too unsatisfactory. A trade union, whether registered or not, has an assured legal status and is free from the illegality which in the past might be held to attach to it at common law on the ground that it was a combination in restraint of trade. Though not a corporation but a voluntary unincorporated society, it enjoys some of the advantages of corporations and escapes some of their liabilities. It cannot be sued, or its property made liable, for tortious acts committed by it or in behalf of it in furtherance of a trade dispute; nor can agreements between it and its members, other unions, or employers be enforced at law or become the subject of actions for breach of contract.

VOLUNTARY REGISTRATION

In well-organized industries no employer thinks of opening his works during a strike, since he knows that there will be no black-legging, and in such industries, therefore, picketing is not important. It is necessary, however, in industries or sections of industries still struggling to be organized, and since 1906 the law as to picketing has allowed a reasonable latitude. With respect to internal affairs, the tendency of the law has been to leave unions free to conduct their own business in the way they think best, to handle without interference such matters as the election of officers, the balloting of members preparatory to a strike, and—with one important exception—the use of trade-union funds. Registration is optional; and though registered unions contain about four-fifths of the trade unionists in the country, some small societies do not trouble to register. The latter can, if they please, apply for certification, and the certificate, if granted, is evidence that they are trade unions within the meaning of the acts, but apart from that it confers no advantages. The formalities of registration include the making of an initial return to the Registrar of Friendly Societies giving the relevant facts as to the objects, constitution and rules, officers, assets and liabilities, receipts and expenditures in the last preceding year, provision for investment and a periodical audit, and similar matters, together with annual returns of a less elaborate kind in subsequent years. Registration gives some assurance to members of unions of the proper conduct of their societies, but its other advantages are mainly of a semi-technical character, and it makes no fundamental alteration in the legal status of a union. Unregistered and registered unions possess substantially the same rights, and the statement sometimes made that unions must be registered or certified in order to take advantage of the acts giving them protection is without foundation.

Finally—an important point—unions possess considerable freedom to develop on such lines, and to assume such new functions, as they may from time to time desire. An attempt to circumscribe that liberty to grow was made in 1910, when in a decision on a case relating to expenditures by a union for political purposes the House of Lords treated the definition of a trade union contained in the Acts of 1871 and 1876 as a limiting, not merely a descriptive, definition, with the result that the application of trade-union funds to the purposes in question was held to be *ultra vires*. Had that judgment stood, trade unions would have been restricted to the objects mentioned as most characteristic of them in the legislation of the seventies. They would have been precluded, for example, not only from paying their officials who happened to be members of Parliament and from contributing to a political party, but also presumably from expenditure on activities that have been carried on ever since trade unions existed, such as sending deputations to ministers and M. P.'s, not to mention such newer departures as subscriptions to the Workers' Educational Association or to Ruskin College. Two years later these effects of the decision were undone by Parliament, but it left, nevertheless, a legacy which is regarded by most trade unionists as a serious infringement of trade-union liberties.

The Act of 1913, the first expressly relating to political activities of unions, removed the absolute prohibition of the use of trade-union funds for political purposes, but it legalized such use only on condition that it should be approved on a union ballot by the majority of members voting, that a separate political fund should be established, that individual members giving notice of objection in the prescribed manner should be exempt from contributing, and that no member so exempted should be subject to any disadvantage. The Act of 1927 went farther. Not only did it, as explained above, forbid Civil Service unions to have political objects, but in the

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case of all unions it substituted—to use popular language—"contracting in" for "contracting out." Instead, that is to say, of requiring the exemption from the political levy of any member not desiring to pay, it made it illegal to levy any member who does not give notice in writing that he desires to pay. Thus all members of a union are at liberty, if they please, to contribute to its political fund; but in view of the dislike of correspondence felt by normal human beings, it is improbable that all who are willing to contribute actually do so.

In spite of the tortuous development of trade-union law, British trade unionism, on the eve of the war, was a great and growing power. It had suffered a severe shock in 1926 and again, as a result of the depression, in the years following 1929, but it had weathered both storms and from 1935 on was more than regaining the ground lost. The membership of just over five millions represented at the Trades Union Congress held in September of the present year was the highest since 1922. The organization of some of the older unions leaves a good deal to be desired, but the tendency of the last two decades has been on the whole in the direction of unification and consolidation. Except in the case of isolated firms, mostly found in rural districts and small country towns, the question of recognition, which caused so much trouble in the past, is now almost a dead issue. The settlement of wages and working conditions by collective bargaining between the representatives of unions and employers is the rule in all the more important industries; nor does anyone seriously question its desirability. Of the more intangible matters of status and influence it is less easy to speak with confidence. It is sufficient to say that trade unionism is now generally accepted as a normal and beneficial feature of English life.

LABOR IN WAR TIME: ARBITRATION

What have been the effects of the war on the position of trade unionism? One might attempt to reply to that question by enumerating the changes in industry which have succeeded each other so rapidly in the last two years, and especially since May, 1940. One might answer it, again, by referring to the fact that the Minister of Labor and several of his colleagues in the government are trade unionists of high standing; that—a more important point—new departures in policy affecting industry and labor are normally made only after consultation with a body on which trade unionists sit not merely as individuals but as representatives of the trade-union movement; that in such matters as the temporary suspension of trade customs and rules and the application of the important Essential Work Orders, the advice of that body has been regularly sought, and care has been taken to safeguard trade-union rights. One could say, in short, that since May, 1940, organized labor has not stood, as in 1914-18, outside the machine planning the economic side of the war but has been a responsible part of it; and that the treatment of labor not as a subordinate to be given orders but as a full partner in the war effort, far from impeding the mobilization of industry for victory, has greatly facilitated it.

The statement is sometimes heard that trade-union liberties have been abolished during the war as the result of the establishment of a system of compulsory arbitration. To what extent is this statement well founded? First, let us consider the facts. The provisions as to arbitration are contained in an Order of the Minister of Labor, known as The Conditions of Employment and National Arbitration Order, which came into force on July 25, 1940. It lays down that when a dispute occurs or is thought likely to occur, either party may report it to the Minister of Labor; that the Minister shall then refer it for settlement to the conciliation machinery normally used by unions and employers, when such machinery exists; that, if no such machinery is available, he may refer it to the National Arbitration Tribunal; and that he shall also refer it to the Tribunal if the ordinary procedure of conciliation fails to produce a settlement with reasonable promptness. A strike or lockout is illegal (1) if the dispute has not been reported to the Minister, (2) if, in the event of its not being otherwise settled, the Minister has referred it to the National Arbitration Tribunal within twenty-one days of its being reported to him, (3) if the strike or lockout is in contravention of any agreement, decision, or award made, as above, by a conciliation board or by the Tribunal. The penalties for a breach of the order are the same as for other offenses under the Defense of the Realm Regulations.

In considering the significance of this departure, two facts should be remembered. In the first place, the order was not imposed by the mere fiat of the Minister on a reluctant body of trade unionists and employers. On the contrary, before being issued, it was submitted to a Joint Consultative Committee, composed of an equal number of representatives of both, appointed "to advise the Minister of Labor on all matters arising out of legislation passed by Parliament." Thus the consent of the representatives of both parties was obtained in advance. In the second place, the order provides for compulsory arbitration in the last resort, and in the last resort only. The Joint Consultative Committee had emphasized that "the machinery of negotiation existing in any trade or industry for dealing with questions concerning wages and conditions of employment shall continue to operate." The Minister of Labor accepted their recommendation and the order was based on that principle. Its first section expressly states that it is "for the purpose of settling trade disputes which cannot otherwise be determined." It confers on the Minister power to refer a dispute to the National Arbitration Tribunal only after the ordinary machinery of negotiation, when such exists, has been

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used and has proved ineffective. It puts the power of the law not merely behind the awards of the Tribunal but behind agreements reached by voluntary negotiations. Indeed, it is at pains to fortify the latter. It lays down that, in industries governed by collective agreements between employers and trade unions representing substantial proportions of the employers and workers in an industry, all employers in the trade and district concerned shall observe conditions of employment not less favorable than those contained in such agreements.

It will be seen, therefore, that the order, so far from superseding trade unionism, relies throughout upon it and at some points strengthens it. If that was its intention, it has been realized in practice. No serious stoppages have occurred in Great Britain since the beginning of the war, though minor disputes are of course inevitable and continue to take place. The time lost through them is almost negligible; in the first six months of this year it was well under 0.5 per cent of the possible working time. The majority of such disputes are settled, without coming before the Arbitration Tribunal, by the ordinary peace-time procedure of negotiations between the representatives of unions and employers.

The legal obligation which the order imposes to comply with an agreement or award has, no doubt, some significance. This war is a popular war, not in the sense that anyone likes it, but that the great mass of ordinary people in Great Britain believe that most of the things which they value in life are at stake and that they mean, therefore, to see the business through. The order represents the prevalent sentiment against stoppages at such a moment. Since, however, agreements and awards are generally observed, the question of the practicability of compelling the observance of them, which in other circumstances might be formidable, has hardly arisen. It is probably true to say that the majority of employers and workers remain unaware of any alteration in the customary procedure for settling their disputes.

Denmark Signs Up

BY GUNNAR LEISTIKOW

WHAT is the significance of Denmark's adherence to the Anti-Comintern Pact? None whatever, if we are to believe the Danish Foreign Office, which in an official apologia points out that the pact "demands no political obligations from the kingdom" and declares that Denmark's non-belligerent status is in no way affected. Perhaps this statement should be interpreted to mean: Denmark signs because it has been ordered to do so, but we wish the world to know that we are only paying lip-service to Nazi ideology.

According to reliable information from private Danish sources, however, the signing of the pact involves more than mere lip-service. A few weeks ago the Germans presented excessive demands to the Danish government, even asking it to join the war against Russia and to put into the field an army of, it is reported, 200,000 men—an almost incredible figure, since for Denmark's population it would be the equivalent of a United States force of 7,400,000 men. This demand was met with a definite No. The King declared he would rather abdicate than see his government sign the pact with such a commitment included. The Germans, eager to avoid a clash with their only well-behaved ward, dropped this demand for the time being, and a compromise agreement was reached permitting Denmark to retain its non-belligerence and exempting it from mobilization "except in an extreme emergency."

The pact was signed by Denmark's Foreign Minister, Erik Scavenius. Scavenius is often called Denmark's Quisling, but it is nearer to the truth to consider him a Danish Hácha. A landed aristocrat, he despises the Nazis as criminals and barbarians, but he is a cynical admirer of the Machiavellian conception of power and is impressed by the efficiency of the Nazi war machine and the organizational gift of the Germans. His chief doctrine, as frequently expressed to this writer before the war, is that Denmark, geographically at the mercy of Germany, must never come into conflict with its neighbor to the south. This does not imply that Denmark must give in to every German whim. On the contrary, Scavenius used to believe it essential to convince the Germans that their own interests would be best served by non-interference in Denmark's internal affairs. During the first World War his clever maneuvering as Foreign Minister did much to preserve Denmark's neutrality, and the prestige he thus acquired has ever since given him a paramount influence on his country's foreign policy. Even when out of office he has been Denmark's *éminence grise,* and it has always been taken for granted that in an emergency he would again head the Foreign Office.

Such an emergency arose with the fall of France. Europe was stunned by the quickness of the knockout. In Scandinavia it was generally felt that everything was lost, and that Britain, insufficiently prepared, was headed for the same fate as France. The Danes thought that the

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life or death of their small occupied country depended on their coming to terms quickly with victorious Germany. "Let Scavenius do it," was the feeling in influential circles. Scavenius did it, expressing in his inauguration speech his belief that a new era had begun for Europe under Germany's leadership.

A few weeks later, in September, the RAF beat off the *Luftwaffe's* offensive, and a wave of optimism and expectation of a swift British victory swept over Denmark. One of the few Danes who did not let his emotions affect his capacity for cool calculation was the Foreign Minister. Well acquainted with Germany's military might and skeptical about the democracies, of which he has no profound knowledge and which he despises for their reluctance to meet Hitler's challenges, he believed and still believes that Germany is going to win the war. The fact that many of Denmark's foremost politicians are of quite another opinion does not trouble him. Extravagantly self-assured, he considers himself one of Europe's ablest political chess players and is inclined to despise anybody who disagrees with him.

For the Germans, Denmark's adherence to the Anti-Comintern Pact means that Hitler's favored method of pre-war days still works with appeasers. When he occupied Denmark, Hitler promised not to interfere with their internal affairs as long as the Danes displayed loyalty toward their new masters. Berlin has kept that promise in that Denmark is still allowed to have its democratic institutions, and any interference is managed discreetly by the German minister instead of by a Nazi *Gauleiter.* Theoretically Danish sovereignty and integrity are still intact, and when Communists are rounded up and incautious writers are imprisoned, the dirty work is done not by the Gestapo but by Danish police, whose concentration camps are definitely less unpleasant.

In November, 1940, the tiny Danish Nazi Party tried to seize power, but when it became clear that it had hardly a shade of popular support, the Germans, tired of the Quisling mess in Norway, left it in the lurch and allowed the Danish police to take care of their fifth columnists. At Christmas time, however, they explained to the Danish government that they could not tolerate continued exclusion from the Danish Cabinet of representatives of the only party showing any understanding of Germany's mission. The Danish government, strongly backed by the King, held that this was a violation of the German promise of non-interference and left it to the Germans to abandon their demands or destroy their own legend. Berlin, therefore, dropped the Danish Nazis for the time being.

By granting preferential treatment as a reward for non-resistance the Germans have allowed Denmark's economic situation to deteriorate much more slowly than that of the rest of occupied Europe. With conditions far more tolerable than elsewhere, the opposition of the people has of course been less determined than, for instance, in terrorized Norway or Holland. But this by no means implies that the Danes acquiesce. Their resistance merely takes a different form.

Denmark is the land of the Middle Way. By cultivating the soil the Danes have built up a civilization without great class distinctions; they are proud to inhabit a country "where few have too much and fewer have too little." They are known to their neighbors as good-humored and easygoing. Such a nation naturally seeks compromise in preference to conflict. So when an occupation which the Danes felt unable to prevent cut off trade with Britain, it was a matter of course for them to continue collaboration with their other big customer, Germany. But after some time it became clear that this collaboration was not reciprocal. The Germans bought whatever the Danes were still able to produce, but they did not pay. The farmers got their money, but not from the Germans. It was the Danish Exchequer which advanced the money, giving credit to the Germans—amounting now nearly to two billion kroner!—thus forcing the country into a ruinous inflation. This inflation is aggravated by the worst unemployment ever experienced, for industries are being shut down for lack of imported raw materials. Even the standard of living of those still employed is being drastically reduced because wages are not allowed to follow the ever-rising cost of living. Thus class antagonisms are intensified. The farmers are unable to spend their inflation kroner; the bourgeoisie is being ruined by the blockade; and the workers here as elsewhere bear the brunt of the economic collapse.

In all classes feeling is running high against the Germans, who have brought ruin to a once prosperous little nation. Sabotage is flourishing everywhere—a peculiar sort of sabotage, much less spectacular than in other countries but perhaps not less effective. Violence is rare among these mild people. The Middle Way man has his own Middle Way form of sabotage. Wherever production is to German order, slowdowns are the rule. Nobody is organizing this—there is no underground movement of importance—but it is as general as it is spontaneous.

When Ribbentrop's speech at the signing of the Anti-Comintern Pact exposed the humbug and showed that the pact was directed much more at Britain and the United States than at Russia, the Danes could no longer contain themselves and thousands crowded the streets of Copenhagen in spontaneous demonstrations against the pact—a very unusual act for this calm and level-headed people. They sang "Tipperary" in front of the German headquarters, hailed the King, and shouted, "Down with the traitor Scavenius." How much more violent these demonstrators would have been had they known of the secret clause committing Denmark to mobilization whenever the Germans may choose to declare an "extreme emergency"!

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The Future of the Republican Party

[*Last week* The Nation *printed an article by Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., concerning the future of the Republican Party. Mr. Schlesinger's thesis, briefly, was that the issue of isolationism had brought about a division in the party comparable to the division on the slavery issue which resulted in the dissolution of the Whig Party shortly before the Civil War. Mr. Schlesinger contended that unless the Republican Party gave full support to the foreign policy advocated by Wendell Willkie it would meet the same fate, "Willkie leading the 'Conscience Republicans' into a union with the New Deal Democrats behind some progressive candidate in 1944, in opposition to the Know Nothing and appeasement elements of both parties united behind someone like Lindbergh."* The Nation *is pleased to print the following comments on Mr. Schlesinger's article by Republican leaders. These statements, it should be pointed out, were written before the outbreak of Japanese-American hostilities, and both Senator Taft and Senator Vandenberg, representing the isolationist point of view in the discussion, have since announced their complete support of the country's war effort.*—EDITORS THE NATION.]

Wendell Willkie

I HAVE read Mr. Schlesinger's thoughtful article with great interest, dismissing of course any coupling of myself with historical figures. I was particularly struck by his analysis of the significance of the Chamberlain and Churchill regimes. The suggestion that England in times of crisis has a conservative aristocracy upon which to depend for leadership while we in this country, having no such continuously privileged class, must turn to a radical democracy is novel and thought-provoking. To Mr. Schlesinger's great praise of the Churchill leadership, I subscribe heartily, though frankly I had thought of it in terms of the characteristics and abilities of an individual, not in terms of an aristocratic tradition. (Incidentally, could I have been right in detecting an implication on the part of such a good New Dealer as Mr. Schlesinger that England's conservative aristocracy offers better leadership in times of crisis than our own radical democracy?)

The well-developed and scholarly comparison of the role of the Whig Party before the Civil War with the role of the Republican Party today is a thesis on which I have written and spoken again and again in an effort to illustrate for the Republican Party the danger of the present course of its Congressional leaders. As Mr. Schlesinger says, it is hard to convince those whose minds are closed to the seriousness of this crisis. But when he says that "the vote on the Neutrality Act shows how little effect his [my] recent manifesto to Republicans had on the party," I should like to point out a sequence of events which was most encouraging to me.

If he will remember, the Administration was content to attack the Neutrality Act piecemeal, apparently feeling that it had not the strength to do otherwise. It not only did not ask for repeal; it did not even ask that American ships be permitted to go into belligerent waters to carry the goods we were producing for the nations that were resisting Hitler. It only asked that we arm our merchant ships in order that they might protect themselves. This characteristic indirection and irresolution seemed to me tragic in view of the national effort and the national need. In the Administration's timidity there was a great chance for the Republican Party to offer genuine leadership. On the evening of October 6 I pointed out this opportunity and begged Republicans to seize it if they hoped to be a force in their country's future. A week later three Republican Senators came out for a clean repeal of the Neutrality Act. This action took the ball away from the Administration leaders and set them scrambling to catch up, forcing on them a more comprehensive program than they had planned. In the meantime more than a hundred leading Republicans in forty-two states joined me in a manifesto to the effect that the Neutrality Act should be repealed.

The result was no mere authorization to arm merchant vessels but an acknowledgment as well of our right to enter any port we might find it necessary to enter for the delivery of our goods. In other words, though we did not win the moral victory and self-respect which clear-cut repeal of the Neutrality Act would have given us, we did gain all the practical advantages we needed. The Republican roll call on that vote does not tell the story. For it was Republican leadership and pressure on the Administration that brought about that result. There are more ways than one to skin a cat.

The "Conscience Republicans," as Mr. Schlesinger so aptly names them by historical analogy, perhaps will not have to leave their party in order to make their views effective. Their number within the party has been growing at an amazing rate. It is true that as yet their international position has not been translated into many votes on the floor of Congress. But close observers have noted strongly blown straws indicating the methods by which politicians shift. For example, take Senator Robert

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Taft, the ablest of the Republican isolationists. A few months ago Senator Taft publicly said that those of us in the Republican Party, including myself, who had always advocated an international viewpoint should be eliminated from leadership of the party because on the most important issue of our times we were misleading the party. Of late Senator Taft has been saying that the international issue is not a party issue or a political issue; it is an American issue (whatever that means), which only happens to cut across party lines. Today he feels that, despite the Japanese crisis in the Pacific and the sinking of American ships in the Atlantic, domestic matters are the important issues of our times. Our foreign policy has been adopted and we all must support it. In other words, Bob has read the handwriting; he has been hearing from home.

Perhaps the efforts of those who feel as I do have not been as ineffectual as the vote on the Neutrality Act might indicate. And perhaps the "Conscience Republicans" will not have to leave their party, but will merely take it over after its momentary (historically speaking) control by a few Congressmen who momentarily (historically speaking) were isolationists.

I thoroughly agree with Mr. Schlesinger, however, that unless the Republican Party does become aware of the totalitarian threat and adopts an even more definite and effective attitude toward the totalitarian powers than the present inadequate attitude of the Administration, unless it recognizes that America must assume world leadership not only now but after the war, it will suffer the fate of the Whigs, and suffer it quickly. As a matter of fact, the Republican Party would already be in the process of demise if the majority of its Congressional representation were truly representative. And it will die unless its growing membership of "Conscience Republicans" sees that its Congressional representatives truly reflect the overwhelming Republican sentiment about America's position in world affairs.

Unfortunately, the Republicans now in Congress are encouraged in their unwise position by the inadequacies of the Administration's leadership. Its halting, at times obscure and conflicting, foreign policy, its long period of appeasement of Japan, its lack of candor and vigor with reference to American participation in the European conflict muddy the issue and give encouragement and life to the negative and isolationist position taken by many Congressmen, both Republican and Democratic.

Before I close, I should like to comment briefly on one other point in Mr. Schlesinger's article. He speaks of "the obsolete economic positions" of which I "have made so much in the past." My economic position is based on a belief that the system of free enterprise, functioning in a democracy, offers a greater chance for individual and collective freedom, development, and happiness and for genuine civil liberty than any other system the world has ever tried. I know that this system has been abused —and abused most by those who have gained most from it; that under it the good things of life have been concentrated in the hands of too few people; and that its benefits must be shared by all men or it will not survive. But I believe that by wise legislation and humane social controls the system can be made to function for the greater, not the lesser, good. In our own time we have had the opportunity to see three fundamentally different economic systems. And it has been my observation that under our free-enterprise system, even now, with all its abuses, men have been better off and have had a greater measure of freedom than they have had under communism as practiced in Russia or under fascism as practiced in Germany.

My quarrel with the New Deal has not been that it sought to correct the abuses of the free-enterprise system or to cause a wider distribution of its benefits, but that fanatical theorists under the guise of reform were gleefully and irresponsibly trying to destroy the system itself. Furthermore, I have resented the New Deal's recent efforts to play politics with labor and to bring the labor movement under government control just as much as I did its corresponding earlier efforts to hamper and destroy the other economic forces of our life. I have advocated appropriate regulation of both for the common good.

These are my basic economic beliefs. They may be "obsolete" in Mr. Schlesinger's economic lexicon. But to my mind they represent the freedom of the present and the hope of the future.

I thank *The Nation* for the opportunity to comment on Mr. Schlesinger's article. Both Republicans and Democrats would do well to read it as an arresting analysis which has in telling fashion projected the present against the background of our past.

Arthur H. Vandenberg

United States Senator from Michigan

UNFORTUNATELY, under the pressure of the moment I do not have the time to analyze Mr. Schlesinger's article closely. But I have seen enough to know that the author—although undoubtedly earnest and sincere in his prejudicial conclusions—entirely ignores the *realities* which a majority of Republicans in Congress believe they have sustained, and that he is equally blind to what I believe is a clear majority desire of the American people that the Republican political promises of the last campaign shall be faithfully kept. Fidelity to pledges does not ordinarily precipitate a political fatality.

The voters will decide this argument next fall. I suggest at that time that you check the returns in comparison with Mr. Schlesinger's present melancholia. I remember poignantly how often in the twenties I used to bury the Democratic Party and preach its funeral oration.

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Harold E. Stassen

Governor of Minnesota

AS ONE of the Republicans who have been early, consistent, and outspoken in opposition to isolationism and in support of the foreign policy of the present federal Administration, I nevertheless take direct issue with the conclusion of Mr. Schlesinger that the continuing differences of opinion upon this question will spell the doom of the Republican Party.

We have developed a two-party system of government. The two parties are the Republican and Democratic, and because of the growth of local election laws and local office-holders throughout the land, these two parties, in my judgment, will continue to be the vehicle by which alternatives will be presented to the people.

It is only natural and right under a two-party system that the minority party should have room within it for a wide diversity of opinion among those who do not approve of the total policies of the majority party. As election time approaches, the minority party through primaries and conventions makes its decisions on the program, principles, and candidates to be presented to the people. The voters then choose between the alternatives, usually finding some things they approve of and some they disapprove of in each party.

I contend that the history of the Whig Party does not present a parallel. The Whig Party fell apart while in office as the majority party, not while in the minority. In 1848 it elected General Zachary Taylor President. He died in office shortly afterward, and Vice-President Fillmore, who had very different views and favored appeasement, succeeded him. A violent controversy broke out with Seward, who was in Taylor's Cabinet. The Missouri Compromise was passed. Internal strife increased. At the next convention, on the fifty-eighth ballot, an exhausted Whig convention nominated General Winfield Scott, who then specifically repudiated the party's appeasement platform. He was defeated overwhelmingly, and the Whig Party died. The Democratic Party won the election on the very appeasement and compromise program which the Whigs, under Fillmore, had been following; and as we know, this Democratic Party is still very much alive. The rise of the Republican Party followed, made possible by the fact that party government was in a formative stage; many parties were in the field, with none of them facing squarely the overshadowing issue of the day.

My definite disagreement with the author's argument is further based on our experience in Minnesota. From 1930 to 1938 the Republican Party in Minnesota was relatively weaker than the party is nationally today. It held very few offices. It was sharply divided within itself. In 1938, through the primaries and subsequent convention, the party adopted a definite, constructive, soundly liberal program and was decisively placed in power by the people of the state. The 1940 election brought a similar result, and today the Republican Party is the majority party.

In my view, the present split in the Democratic Party on foreign policy is much more serious to the country than the differences in the Republican Party. In a number of crucial votes in Congress the program of the Democratic Administration would have been rejected, with tragic consequences, because of this split within its own party if a vital number of Republicans had not placed their country above their party and prevented defeat of the proposals. Increased frankness by the President and further efforts to heal these breaks in the Democratic Party would be a good thing for the country.

It is my view that the present party labels will continue to change in their meaning to the people, but that they will not go out of existence.

I observe many signs of growing vigor and vitality in the Republican Party. It is my hope that through this internal process the Republican Party will come to stand for a realistic, constructive, forward-looking program dealing with both domestic and world problems.

Robert A. Taft

United States Senator from Ohio

I AM afraid that Mr. Schlesinger's picture of the line-up in America today is distorted by his prejudice against conservatism of any kind and in favor of an all-out war against Hitler. On questions of party policy Republicans may well hesitate to take the advice of one who seems to be opposed to every principle for which the Republican Party has ever stood. It is simply untrue that the Republican Party or members of the party have "harassed, sabotaged, and obstructed the attempts of the Administration to work for the destruction of Nazism." They have joined in voting countless billions and granting almost unlimited powers necessary to carry out the program, advocated by both parties and both candidates a year ago, of national defense and aid to Britain—short of war. They have only opposed those measures of which the logical conclusion is an American expeditionary force of ten million men, representing the effort necessary to impose a military defeat on Hitler in Europe. They do not believe that Hitler presents such a threat to the trade or safety of the United States as requires the sacrifice of several million American boys on the battlefields of the world.

Nor is Mr. Schlesinger correct in attributing the position of the majority of Republicans to their conservatism. The more conservative members of the party—the Wall Street bankers, the society group, nine-tenths of the plutocratic newspapers, and most of the party's financial contributors—are the ones who favor intervention in Europe. Mr. Schlesinger's statement that the business

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community in general has tended to favor appeasing Hitler is simply untrue. I have received thousands of letters on both sides of the question, and I should say without question that it is the average man and woman—the farmer, the workman, except for a few pro-British labor leaders, and the small business man—who are opposed to war. The war party is made up of the business community of the cities, the newspaper and magazine writers, the radio and movie commentators, the Communists, and the university intelligentsia.

Mr. Schlesinger's parallel to the Whig Party is interesting, but upside down. In 1854 the Democrats, except for a few, were for slavery, just as today the Democrats, except for a few, are for war. As Mr. Schlesinger so well points out, the Whigs tried to dodge the fundamental issue of slavery when the only salvation for the party was to take a definite stand against slavery, and make that the issue in the battle against the Democrats. They were held back by the big business interests, who wanted no interference with Southern trade and no connection with the unpopular Lindberghs of that day, preaching the abolition of slavery. The Whig Party would not appeal to the anti-slavery group; the Democrats had the support of those defending slavery; and there were no followers left for the Whig Party.

So today the Republican Party as a party, and because of differences within the party, has dodged the fundamental issue of war. It has been held back principally by the big business interests of the East, fearful among other fears of Hitler's destruction of our foreign trade. Whoever may be right on the question of foreign policy, it is obvious that a party kills itself and removes any excuse for its existence when it adopts the principles of its opponents. If any credit for this war ever goes to anyone, which I doubt, it will go to Franklin D. Roosevelt, and not to Wendell L. Willkie. Mr. Schlesinger's claim that the Republican Party has failed to measure up to the obligations of the crisis may be just, but the logical conclusion to his argument is that the party should come out definitely against war, as the Whig Party should have come out definitely against slavery. If the Republicans are going to adopt all the political principles of Mr. Roosevelt and Mr. Schlesinger, they might as well close up shop.

There is, however, this distinction between the two situations. Slavery was a continuing and unavoidable domestic issue. Questions of foreign policy, on the other hand, have not ordinarily been vital factors in American politics because they have lasted only for brief periods. Those Republican leaders who have insisted that the party take no position on foreign policy have felt that within a short time the country would be united either in war or in peace, and that differences between the parties would be based again on domestic policy. Of course if the difference on foreign policy continues to exist, the Republican Party will have to take a position. Obviously it should not follow the Whig policy of appeasement. It should be opposed to risking the lives of five million American boys in an imperialistic war for the domination of Europe, Asia, and Africa, and the supposed "manifest destiny" of America.

Everybody's Business

BY KEITH HUTCHISON

Those Wall Street Blues

NO OFFICE boy anxious to keep his job would dare whistle anywhere near a broker's board room, for Wall Street's motto for the emergency is "Keep 'em sighing." For many months stock prices have been trending downward in the face of a huge rise in production, handsome increases in profits for most industries, and numerous additional dividends. At the end of November the Dow-Jones average of industrial stocks was little better than in the slump that followed the fall of France and was almost 13 per cent lower than the best level reached last summer. In view of the fact that the long-term war outlook has improved tremendously during the past six months it is hardly possible to blame the war news for the current bearishness.*

What, then, is the reason for the persistent liquidation of stocks? During 1940 and the early part of this year British selling in order to obtain dollars exerted a depressing influence on the market, but since the RFC made a loan permitting the remaining British assets to be frozen, this factor can no longer be held responsible. Nor do the investment trusts appear to be liquidating their portfolios, for according to the market commentator of the *Wall Street Journal* they already hold as much cash as they can safely afford. A clue to the identity of the bears is provided by the monthly SEC reports of "insider" transactions, which show that on balance big stockholders and corporation directors are selling far more than they are buying. In a number of cases the motive appears to be a desire to spread risks by reducing massive holdings in one-time family businesses. Thus Marshall Field, who recently sold a large block of shares in the great Chicago store founded by his grandfather, stated specifically that he did so with a view to diversifying his investments, although he considered that the prospects of the Marshall Field Company were very favorable.

But while many wealthy men are selling for this reason, it does not follow that all of them are reinvesting their money by buying smaller amounts of stock in a variety of industries. Many of them seem to be using the proceeds of sales to add to their bank deposits or to buy government bonds, preferably of the tax-free variety. The usual explanation is that when one's income is in the really high tax brackets even a 10 per cent yield on an equity is not worth the risk in-

* This article was in type before the Japanese launched their attack on the United States and Britain. The market reacted to that news by a general lowering of prices. But the break was not unduly severe in the circumstances, perhaps because the existing level of prices already discounted almost every eventuality.

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volved, because so large a share of the income received is seized by the Treasury.

Toward the end of the year "tax selling" is usually a feature of Stock Exchange business. Quite a lot of experts now make a good living guiding the well-to-do in the art of making the most of their losses. This year the rise in tax rates has encouraged more people than usual to throw out bad investments so that they can use the resultant loss to scale down their taxable incomes. Some transactions of this nature appear a trifle esoteric to those of us whose lives are not complicated by the burdens of high finance. For example, H. J. Nelson, market reporter of *Barron's,* mentioned recently a firm which sold 60,000 shares of New York Central common acquired last May at 12¾ and on which it must have taken a loss of about three points. "So large was this particular tax saving" he wrote, "that it is figured the stock can be reacquired as high as 17 and still make the transaction worth while." There's financial magic for you!

Undoubtedly taxation is the biggest short-term cause of Wall Street's fretfulness, and it is so appalled by the size of the Treasury's take that it gives very little consideration to what is left over. Many corporations, it is true, are paying out in taxes more than half their gross incomes this year; yet in spite of this the majority are able to report substantial increases in net incomes compared with 1940, which was by no means a lean year. As Roger Babson comments in the *Christian Science Monitor,* after pointing to cases where gross profits have increased 100 per cent but net after taxes only 10 per cent, "If these companies had had an increase of only 10 per cent in net profits and no increase in taxes, investors would be very happy."

There is a lot of talk in Wall Street about inflation, but fear of inflation appears so far to have exerted very little influence on the market. Yet if a measure of inflation is coming—and the alleged anti-inflation bill just passed by the House has certainly brought it nearer—it is obvious that real property provides a safer haven for capital than either cash or bonds, the purchasing power of which falls automatically as prices rise. Some of the commodity speculation which has been going on recently has been based on fears—or hopes—of inflation, and there have also been reports of nervous capitalists buying farms, jewels, and paintings. But although equities, and particularly those of the raw-material industries, have usually been considered the safest and most liquid hedge against inflation, the steady rise in commodity prices has failed to stir the Stock Exchange from its lethargy.

Commenting on this situation, the most portentous of our financial Jeremiahs, the *Wall Street Journal,* suggested editorially on November 8 that investors were being moved by a terror even greater than the fear of inflation. Mentioning the war merely as a contributing factor to the investor's psychosis, this authority declares:

> It is hard to avoid the conclusion that eight years of the New Deal have aroused among capital owners a profound sense of apprehension concerning the stability of the so-called capitalistic structure as a whole, which has caused them to seek shelter for their money at almost any cost in places which seem to be least subject to seismic disturbances. Top-flight bonds come as near to filling that requirement as do anything.

That diagnosis, if correct, indicates that our supposedly hard-headed capitalists have allowed their fears and prejudices to submerge their reasoning faculties. For if the capitalist system is about to collapse, high-grade bonds are unlikely to prove a better shelter than any other form of property. Personally, I would agree that the capitalist system is threatened, but by internal decay rather than by the aggressiveness of the New Deal. The danger will grow so long as the capitalists skulk in their tents and blame everyone but themselves for their plight.

In the Wind

FROM A WASHINGTON LETTER to the *Wall Street Journal,* December 1: "The OPM recently attacked violations of agreements with zinc producers regarding sales practices. Hegeler Zinc Company of Danville, Illinois, and the Tyroler Metals, Inc., of Cleveland were involved. E. C. Hegeler, president of the first company, is a member of the OPM copper and zinc defense industrial committee, and Joseph H. Tyroler of the second company is on the OPM waste-materials dealers' defense industry advisory committee."

AN ORGANIZATION called the Citizens' Committee for Industrial Americanism has been started in St. Louis. No dues are collected, but every member must sign a pledge to vote against strikes if he is a union member or, if he is not, to remain "an independent wage-earner."

THE FIGHT FOR FREEDOM COMMITTEE, which took a poll of war sentiment at the C. I. O. convention, asked for permission to conduct a similar investigation at the convention of the National Association of Manufacturers. The N. A. M. refused the request.

THE TROTSKYITES convicted of trying to undermine the armed forces have asked that Wendell Willkie, who will defend the Stalinist leader, William Schneiderman, handle their appeal in the Supreme Court if a hearing is granted.

THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT has not yet lifted the ban on the London *Daily Worker,* but the editors of the paper have started a new publishing venture called *Workers' News,* which is smaller than the *Daily Worker* in format but similar in content.

FROM A REPORT of army maneuvers in the London *Daily Telegraph:* "The greatest army maneuvers ever held in Britain have just ended with the Battle of Bedfordshire. Fighting for nearly a week led to the complete defeat of an enormous force which was supposed to have invaded England from the sea. Realism reached such a pitch during the operations that no fewer than nineteen officers and men were killed in accidents. The total number of deaths may prove to be even higher."

[*We invite our readers to submit material for In the Wind —either clippings with source and date or stories that can be clearly authenticated. A prize of $5 will be awarded each month for the best item.*—EDITORS THE NATION.]

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A Native at Large

BY JONATHAN DANIELS

Security Is Indivisible

FRIENDS of labor had another chance to cuss the South the day Dixie's Democratic Congressmen marched up, practically in a body, and voted for the drastic anti-strike legislation shaped by Representative Smith of Virginia, whose opposition to labor did not begin with defense. Opposed not only by labor but also by the President, the bill would not have had a chance in the House without such Southern voting. It is easy to understand, therefore, that labor's friends in the North may feel that once again human freedom has been lynched by a South devoted still to the attitudes of slavery. It might be more profitable, however, for both the nation and the South if this Southern voting were recognized as another indication that standards of security in labor organization or anything else must be national if they are to be safe anywhere in the nation.

It could be—and probably will be—said that here is another case in which the political bosses of the South are acting in tough disregard of the South's poll-tax-shackled slaves. But the Southern Congressmen voted as solidly for the bill in the states which have no poll tax as in the states which have one. Everywhere, I think, they voted close to the sentiments of their constituents.

There may be individual Southern Congressmen who are philosophic reactionaries. A great many more of them have their ears to the earth of the red hills and the sandy bottoms. They voted as the South felt, and their voting is the best and saddest indication of the weakness of labor organization in the South. Undoubtedly it is weak because Southern employers have opposed unionization and have used everything from holiness preachers to red-necked deputy sheriffs, from the Bible to the bull whip, to keep unionization down. But Southern employers have no monopoly of opposition to unions or of these methods for combating them.

There are other reasons for the weakness of labor in the South. Secure persons at a distance might put down ignorance. Some would say stupidity. The ignorance is undoubtedly real, though Southern states spend more in proportion to their wealth on schools than almost any other states in America. But the real problem lies in the tragic fact that the masses of the South—the region of the biggest families and the most young people—are crowding around the too few jobs for too many people. The same pressure which filled Harlem with Negroes, California with Okies, is on every job in the South. The Negroes have suffered most and been pushed most easily out of their town jobs. Since tractors have come in, there are fewer places now even for tenants on farms. The poverty down below any labor movement in the South must be dealt with before that labor movement can hope to be secure. The South has done some desperate things, sometimes silly things, in its desire to get plants and jobs. It has sometimes scrapped liberties in a hunger for bread. It has sometimes sought bread and got gold brick and sweatshop. Exploiters have ridden the desire. But the pressure at the bottom has continued.

What the Okies got in California was probably still not worse than what they left behind. New York is disturbed now by conditions in Harlem. There is still something in Harlem which keeps the stream coming from the South. It does not have to be perfection. Word comes back by the grapevine that it is not. Still the migrants move. For all the talk of prosperity now, for all the angry talk about labor selfishness in a time of crisis, labor standards in America are not high. The Bureau of Employment Security reports that four-fifths of the defense workers in the United States make less than $30 a week. That certainly is not opulence. But as defense began in America, a careful student of conditions in the South estimated that 11,000,000 people there—a third of all the people—were members of families with annual cash incomes of $250 a year or less. It is more than a joke that a Negro who got his first pay check on a defense project cried, "Thank God for Hitler."

A good many Southerners have been thankful even for sweatshop jobs. They have built up in themselves, perhaps out of ignorance, a fear of anything that might shut the shirt factory, even if the threat carried also a promise of improvement and a hope for decency.

Economic Problem No. 1 has been forgotten in the more pressing problems of defense. But it is still there. It was in this vote in Congress. It will be involved in every voting to advance America or pull it back. No union can long maintain decent wages in Mississippi high above the indecent incomes of thousands of people in Mississippi. Jobs cannot be protected until there are more jobs. As Southerner I know that this anti-labor voting in Congress does not mean that most Southern Congressmen or their constituents want to keep so many people poor and unprotected. It does mean that a better chance for labor in the South is the only sound basis for the security of labor in the nation—or for any other security anywhere.

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BOOKS and the ARTS

An Invitation to Minerva

OPINIONS OF OLIVER ALLSTON. By Van Wyck Brooks. E. P. Dutton and Company. $3.

IN MR. BROOKS'S new volume no effort seems to be made to maintain any significant distinction between the opinions of the author and those of the fictitious critic, "Oliver Allston," upon whose supposed writings he comments. The book appears to have been written over a considerable period of time since, despite its somewhat miscellaneous content, it falls into three clearly marked sections which seem to represent the author's reaction to three intellectual climates to which he found himself exposed in rapid succession. In the first he is concerned with defining his attitude toward—it is also almost proclaiming his identity with—the New England tradition of the classic period. In the second he discusses, in terms which seem for the most part definitely pre-war, his liberal-socialist political creed. In the third he undertakes to defend a conception of greatness in literature in chapters obviously intended as his contribution to a discussion which began when the new World War suggested to writers, as to everyone else, a revaluation of their aims and ideals.

This last section is undoubtedly the most timely and the most challenging as well as the freshest. In it Mr. Brooks makes a plea for what he calls "primary literature" as opposed to "coterie literature"; and under the latter head he includes for rejection not only Eliot, Joyce, and Proust but nearly all the writing which intellectuals have accepted as the modern contribution. This writing is, he says, merely "coterie writing" because it neither expresses nor wishes to express the ideals, opinions, or aspirations of the normal man, being instead merely the process by which the writers are engaged in taking in one another's washing. It is not "primary" because it never treats adequately the "great themes," which are "honor, justice, mercy, love," because it has no "large hope," and because, having none, it has ceased to demand that a great writer be a great man writing and asks instead only that he exhibit technical dexterity and technical complexity. It is, he adds, a reaction against something but not a reaction in favor of anything important enough to justify its continuing existence.

Probably most critics of literature have felt at times as Mr. Brooks feels, and probably more of them are willing now than at any other recent period to grant the force of the arguments he uses. Certainly there have been few epochs in the world's history when the most admired books exhibited so little love of life or so little faith in either God or man, when it was so nearly taken for granted that despair or contempt or scorn was the inevitable tone of any serious work. But one wonders if the writers, considered as a special class, can be held so completely accountable as Mr. Brooks wishes to make them. Without going into the question of the extent to which the writer should or can be the creator rather than the mere articulator of his age's world view, it can at least be assumed that our writers have not, by and for themselves alone, created the attitudes which they define, and that the choice for them has often been a choice between a despair which they as well as their readers felt and a fictitious optimism which neither they nor their readers could sincerely accept. That most of our best writers have lacked large hope may not mean that they have perversely chosen despair. It may mean simply that only by sharing to some considerable extent their age's lack of that large hope could they become great writers. To say this is not to deny that large hope is a desirable thing or that our great writers are less than the greatest of their predecessors. But it is to doubt that it is wholly their fault rather than, in part at least, their misfortune.

Mr. Brooks does not deny that he himself at one time held a less favorable view of our remoter past than he does now or that he has to some degree changed his opinions. He does not, however, seem to realize the extent to which his attitude is even now occasionally inconsistent. Condemning those who, like Santayana, despise our own age when they compare it with a particular past, he seems to forget that he himself is busily despising it by comparison with another past; praising failure by worldly standards and distrusting the outward signs of success, he nevertheless makes it one of his chief criticisms of our present social system that it bestows these outward signs of success upon the "wrong" people; and in his enthusiasm for the great writers of the past he sometimes seems to forget that some at least of them were criticized by their contemporaries for exactly the same defects which he finds in his own. Thus it is, for example, positively startling to find Allston urging the example of Ibsen upon American writers quite as though Allston had forgotten that Ibsen, far from seeming to the nineteenth century a creator of a primary literature breathing large hope, was regarded as one of the fountainheads of that decadence which Mr. Brooks so hates and fears. It requires a Bernard Shaw, startling his hearers by proclaiming, "I am, like Shelley, a vegetarian, an atheist, and a revolutionary," to remind us how thoroughly time regularizes heroes and how much of what is sometimes spoken of as the great consistent tradition is really the creation of traditionalists who manage somehow to fit the surviving dead into it while leaving to traditionalists of the future the task of doing the same thing for those present-day writers whom they themselves are unable to stomach.

What I find most disturbing is not, however, the main thesis concerning the nature of primary literature or what seem to me the occasional inconsistencies but the implied suggestion that a new and better literature may be created by the mere determination to create it, that the writer should now make up his mind to write with large hope about the great themes. There is an old and I believe sound conviction that Minerva does not always accept even the warmest invitations. The thinker may some day think his way through despair; the writer may some day discover a larger hope. But until that day comes his safety lies in saying what he thinks

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and feels rather than in attempting to think or feel what even the best-intentioned critic tells him he should. I have no plea to make for the literature of the coteries as such. When it does not reach out beyond the coterie which created it, it can have little significance. But I would rather not flee from even coterie literature if that means running straight into the arms of something worse. When one attempts to follow a tradition which one has not been able to assimilate and to make genuinely one's own, one is very likely to produce that something worse. I should call it "stuffed-shirt literature."

JOSEPH WOOD KRUTCH

The Latin American Scene

INSIDE LATIN AMERICA. By John Gunther. Harper and Brothers. $3.50.

THE material for "Inside Latin America" was gathered on a plane trip through twenty countries south of the Rio Grande, and the quality of its writing conveys the rhythm and the kaleidoscopic changes of history and scene which a plane, speeding through time and space, alone can achieve. History, anecdotes, personalities, political trends, and scenic descriptions are juxtaposed in vivid, telling patterns that reveal underlying trends. This readable and informative book was compiled quickly and published quickly, just four months after Gunther completed the last lap of his journey. As the author himself states, it is a report of what he saw and heard, and what he saw and heard is of urgent importance to the American people. Without presenting recipes for hemisphere defense, the book indicates the method for the solution of this vital problem and casts light on regions hitherto largely unknown. It brings Latin America to the people of the United States, makes these remote countries both interesting and familiar. "Inside Latin America" is thus a book that fills an immediate and long-felt need. There will be time, later, for more precise, exact, and scholarly works. At this moment this is the book that will open the eyes of the United States to the fact that Latin America constitutes its exposed southern border, and that a knowledge of social conditions and political events there is essential to the preservation of this country.

In colorful, exciting chapters which capture and hold the reader's interest to the final page Gunther introduces North Americans to that other America of Spanish- and Portuguese-speaking peoples whose destiny is indissolubly linked with their own. By presenting and analyzing the dangerous, often subterranean activities of the aggressor nations operating there he reveals the ominous shadow of Hitler looming over every country in America.

Mr. Gunther has no ax to grind; he is interested only in telling the truth about what is happening in Latin America. The numerous errors and the obvious deficiencies of the book are due to the unreliability of certain of his sources and to a too hurried and limited acquaintance with the material treated. This reviewer disagrees with many of his judgments—for instance, with his evaluation of the present political regimes in Brazil and Bolivia. Gunther's treatment of Getulio Vargas of Brazil is highly uncritical. While Brazil's foreign policy has given official support to hemispheric unity, the government's internal organization constitutes the first fascist pattern in the Western Hemisphere. And as regards Bolivia Mr. Gunther's data are not always strictly accurate. But all this does not negate the fact that in intention and in essence "Inside Latin America" grasps the realities of the contemporary political scene in that vast region south of the Rio Grande.

The chief value of the book is that Gunther shows, graphically and inescapably, the extent and power of fascist infiltration in America's southern neighbors. In doing so, and in presenting to a wide lay public valuable information about an almost unknown field, Gunther has achieved a memorable book. The excellent bibliography will lead the reader on to a more precise study of documentary sources.

HUGO FERNANDEZ ARTUCIO

Two Poets

WHAT ARE YEARS. By Marianne Moore. The Macmillan Company. $1.50.

SELECTED POEMS. By George Barker. The Macmillan Company. $1.90.

OF THESE two poets one has an excess of energy, the other a deficiency of it. It is not altogether because the one is young and on his way and the other arrived and settled. Two quite different national tendencies in contemporary English poetry cross here. George Barker's energy stems not only from his youth but from a tradition, while Miss Moore starts almost from scratch. She is one of that first generation of American modernist poets who in the teens and twenties went into the wilderness and with the aid only of a few volumes of French poetry built their Tower of Babel from the ground up. There is a certain thinness, a certain frailty, which Miss Moore's poetry has in common with that of W. C. Williams, E. E. Cummings, H. D., and even Ezra Pound and Wallace Stevens. It is small-scale poetry, lacking resonance, lacking really culture, belonging to an outlook that has to break things into small pieces in order to see them, that has to destroy the organic unity of everything it treats. Its makers have neither inherited nor acquired enough cultural capital to expand beyond the confines of their immediate experience and of a narrowly professional conception of poetry.

In spite of her fondness for deducing the most serious morals from her material, the unity of Miss Moore's work is too exclusively a unity of sensibility, without intellectual consistency, without large opinions, without a felt center of convictions. Miss Moore makes only aesthetic discriminations; otherwise everything seems to exist on the same single plane. It is a kind of aesthetic pantheism. Instead of finding all heaven she finds all that's nice in a wild flower—or preferably in some more curious object. The firm yet very intricate verse forms she invents are a means of controlling this omnivorous and wonderful sensibility; and express a liking for the rococo, the detailed and involved. But sometimes they express this liking too well, and so lose their efficacy as controls; Miss Moore's predilections, being guided ultimately by nothing outside themselves, can indulge themselves to the point where the formal features of her verse

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no less than its matter seem pure captiousness, pure kittenishness. This all goes back to the central defect of her poetry—the fact that its unity and its direction are determined by a sensibility that is too private and that has no means of transcending itself.

So much for what is wrong with Miss Moore's poetry. Its faults are not so much those of execution as of conception. They spring largely from a failure to discriminate between the important and the unimportant, the pertinent and the not pertinent. As with all eccentric writers, either one grants such limitations or one refuses to read the poetry. Perhaps Miss Moore yields to her limitations too easily, but within them her poetry is perfect. Literally that. It delights even when it irritates:

> . . . Odd Pamunkey
> princess, birdclaw-earringed; with a pet raccoon
> from the Mattapo-
> ni (what a bear!) Feminine
> odd Indian young lady! . . .

Feminine odd American young poetess! It would be difficult, I think, to find anything in the past or present analogous to Miss Moore's particular combination of verbal precision and wit. Its exact quality is that of felicity in the purest and most difficult sense. And felicity in all other English poetry is more casual and more abstract. Miss Moore's belongs to the immediate detail; it is the result of concentration upon the minutest and most idiosyncratic features of experience, and of a hypersensitivity to language only possible in the idiosyncratic writer. The typical Moore poem is a process that explores something, preferably curious or unlikely—the pangolin, marriage, a definition of poetry, quartz clocks—shreds it into many small items of perception and association, and from these draws a succession of general observations expressed with deliberate prosiness. With what careful timing, with what verbal tact does Miss Moore shift her prose into poetry. The usual shortness of her lines and their varied indentation serve to slow up the voice and the eye, thus exposing the subtler accents of sense and grammar and revealing the "excavated" rhymes: contrivances necessary in a verse so lacking an esoteric, obvious accentual rhythm. For this poetry has a metrical system of its own, for the most part unconscious, which depends upon the repetition of certain extended metrical phrases rather than upon a fixed pattern.

For those who already have a notion of Miss Moore's work there is little in this latest collection of her poems to change it markedly. But on the whole I think it an advance. Some of these poems I like better than anything she has written before: Nautilus, Rigorists, Half Deity, and He "Digesteth Harde Yron." In the title poem, What Are Years, Miss Moore announces that what is praised is no longer just beautiful, but noble and good too. The apothegms and moralizations which she introduces like large images to flavor and give point are no longer quite so arch or so cute. History has overtaken the poetess as it overtakes all of us.

What prejudices one—perhaps too much—in favor of George Barker's poetry is its evocations of the past of English poetry. It is not a question of imitation and influence in any conventional way. Barker owns this past congenitally, has it in his bones as well as his lamp, and proves it by putting the

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historical conventions and manners of English poetry successfully into the thick of the most recent contexts. Among the traditions he taps is first of all that pre-Elizabethan, populist, underground, almost folkish tradition, most of whose poets were plebeians, which runs from late Anglo-Saxon verse through ballads, morality plays, Piers Plowman, through comparatively little of Chaucer but more of Lydgate, through Skelton and many anonymous poets to Blake and Ebenezer Jones. Even the particular way in which Barker lacks humor agrees with this tradition. Like Langland and Blake, he invents visions, stages allegories, sees wildly, and denounces apocalyptically. He draws also on early Elizabethan dramatic verse with its closed, ringing, metallic line, and on the kind of declamatory verse found in eighteenth-century poetry such as Young's. Barker writes genuine pseudo-Pindaric odes and is an *enthusiastick* poet, stagey and full of violence and rant. His verse is loose-jointed, gallops like the old fourteener, and his eyeball is always rolling. As a modern poet he can be located halfway between Auden and Dylan Thomas, without being tributary to either. He is fond of the same poetic past as Auden, capitalizes on similar conventions and devices, allegorizes abstractions in the same somewhat Rilkean way, versifies loosely, and is moved to write by the state of the world. But the actual complexion of his verse resembles more that of Thomas's: passionate, irrational, full of quasi-surrealist images, the lines heavy with stresses, alliterations, internal rhymes, and long vowels. It is not, however, so closely textured, and its syntax and sense are more obvious. Barker is more extroverted, more conscious of himself in relation to the external.

A fault Barker shares perhaps with Thomas and a good many other of the new English poets is an inability to modulate, to distribute the emphasis so that a poem will move dramatically and take on shape. In Barker's case there is an impression of an unwearying stridency, unrelieved and unshaded. He is capable of other states of feeling than the impassioned, he can be pathetic and elegiac; read closely, his work has sufficient variety from one poem to the other—in quality, alas, as well as tone. But it is within the single poem that he has a tendency to be monotonous; once having set his pitch he has difficulty in changing it. This makes Barker hard to read, and it also prevents him from delivering himself as honestly as he might like to. Having begun a poem on the level of the sublime, to descend is perilous; hence the posturing, the padding and the bombast. The themes Barker is attracted to are an added liability. He has as little intellectual energy as Miss Moore—his greater resonance is owed to the tradition that backs him up and guides his voice—but his poetry's main argument, namely, the plight of the times, will not allow him to avoid that limitation so well. More than violence of feeling is needed to make poetry here. The fustian is to cover up intellectual impotence: "Spain and Abyssinia lift bloodshot eyes as I go by"; "I sip at suicide in bedrooms or dare pessimistic stars"; "Stood did my bull in the pool of his passion." Nor is Barker above Audenesque patter: the whale hides its head from war "Among the myths and the ideas/Of Atlantis"; there is a "sexual sky." His public poems can be much, much better than this, but generally his poetry is more substantially satisfactory when the self-dramatization takes place on a smaller stage, where the emotions rise from a more personal argument. An authenticity is missing from the odes and elegies which recommends Barker's earlier poems, strained as they are. Fortunately, it returns in the last poems of the book, the Supplementary Personal Sonnets—in my opinion the most perfect things Barker has yet done.

However, one could wish that instead of modifying his ambition Barker would try the more difficult task of developing his powers to equal it. I am tired of small poetry. Poetry is an art equipped to treat everything and to transform everything into itself. The perfection of Miss Moore's poetry is too narrow; it abandons too much. Barker's pretensions—and the fact that he does not fall short of them too ridiculously—are at least a reminder of what poetry once could do, of what vast thirsts it once could satisfy.

CLEMENT GREENBERG

The Making of a Nazi

EDUCATION FOR DEATH. By Gregor Ziemer. Oxford University Press. $2.

"MORALE," says Mr. Wookey in the play, "is a dirty French word I never use." Perhaps it would be just as well if the English-speaking peoples found a word of their own, instead of taking—and misspelling—a French one, to indicate those psychological forces within men which the Nazis have studied so thoroughly and applied so competently to their evil purpose. How competently they are doing it is revealed in this book by Dr. Gregor Ziemer, who spent many years in Germany as director of the American Colony School in Berlin.

To understand the gravity of his revelations one must consider quite seriously—and this is very seldom done—the basic proposition of Nazism, which is that effective *voluntary* cooperation on a basis of equality between distinct and differing human groups has been proved by long and bitter experience to be a psychological impossibility for men; that in order to overcome the futile and everlasting recriminations, bickerings, rival theorizings which the whole history of free and voluntary association reveals, one dominant and powerful group must assert its authority and impose order from above.

It is merely silly to disregard the large element of truth in the fundamental premises of that proposition. The ultimate source of Germany's power is not its own preponderance of physical resources; it is the disunity, the lack of all defensive cohesion, in the far larger mass it now dominates. Again and again Hitler has pointed out that if only Germany could reach complete internal unity, the democracies, the whole world indeed, would be at its mercy, for the one thing the democracies could quite safely be depended upon to do was to quarrel within and among themselves. So long as that was the case, he argued, whatever their bravery, whatever their resources, they were powerless to resist the sweep of German conquest, for to them could be applied the ancient device of "divide and conquer." To Germany would fall the high task of ruling these inferior folk, if not for their own good at least for Germany's.

No Nazi has disguised the fact that the disciplines which

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the ruling order would have to impose upon itself, especially in the earlier phases, would have to be exceedingly severe. How severe, Dr. Ziemer's book makes abundantly clear. Five years ago, if taken seriously—it might very well have been rejected as fiction—it would have created an immense sensation. Today, though they know it to be the truth, it is likely to leave people cold because they have become inured to the appalling things it relates. Our moral nerves are atrophied, a fact of immense danger to us since it causes us to remain relatively inert in the face of immensely threatening psychological forces.

When Dr. Ziemer asked a high German official at what point the Nazi organization became interested in the German child, he received the instant answer, "Before it is conceived." The breeding of Germans for the purpose of producing a warlike and dominant race is being undertaken with the same scientific care that a stockbreeder would employ in breeding prize cattle. For the elimination of undesirables sterilization and euthanasia are freely employed, on both sexes; for the breeding of "state children" and for fertility of the desired kind births out of wedlock are encouraged and organized. In the state-controlled nurseries the moral and psychological conditioning begins. "Nature study," is employed to teach that only the strong survive: "the fly is eaten by the spider, the spider by the sparrow, the sparrow by the hawk, the hawk by the fox, the fox by the dog, the dog by the wolf, the wolf by the hunter; and none show mercy. Good Germans must show no mercy to inferior peoples." There are new nursery rhymes to drive such lessons home:

> "Please," begged the victim, "let me go
> For I am such a little foe."
> "No," said the victor, "not at all,
> For I am big and you are small."

Later boys are encouraged to torture each other, to witness torture "so that they may get accustomed to seeing other human beings suffer." After this preliminary conditioning in childhood and boyhood come the political lessons: Non-German nations are all inferior, most of them sheer vermin whose merciless extinction is both the right and duty of the German *Herrenvolk*.

The method the book describes is succeeding. Millions of youngsters are acquiring a "passion for death" if it be death for the cause of Nazidom, a passion like that of the Moslem fanatic in a holy war; but the Nazi fanatic is a terribly efficient, disciplined fanatic.

What moral forces of equal fervor, within the Christian ethic, are the democracies evolving? In what way, for instance, are the peoples of the democracies so modifying their old nationalist animosities as to make possible the sustained defensive unity of all free men? To what extent is it being brought home to the democracies that "morale" does not consist merely in physical bravery but in such informed political judgment that freedom of criticism and discussion does not become incompatible with the sustained and prolonged cooperation of different, and differing, groups, parties, classes, nations?

To ask the question is to answer it.

NORMAN ANGELL

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ENGLAND

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The New Negro

12,000,000 BLACK VOICES. By Richard Wright. Photo-direction by Edwin Rosskam. The Viking Press. $3.

IF A book is to be judged by what it claims to be, this book is disappointing. It is described in the subtitle as a folk history of the Negro of the United States, but beyond a little doggerel verse from a few Negro folk songs and an occasional sharp interpretation of the Negro's mind at work, it is not a folk history at all. Little or nothing will be found here that is not already known to the moderately keen observer, and certainly this book does not contain half as much information about the Negro as other writers already have presented. What history the book does contain is only a cursory survey of the better-known facts about the Negro: how he was brutally snatched from Africa and pounded down into slavery; how the question of his continued bondage helped to provoke the Civil War; how after that war the Negro discovered his new freedom was essentially empty; how he migrated from the cotton fields of the South to the cities of the North, and found his freedom there rather empty, too. Even this cursory survey is not always sound. For example, Mr. Wright sees the Civil War as mainly a struggle between two groups of leaders, "the Bosses of the Buildings and the Lords of the Land." This is an extreme simplification of what was actually a complicated struggle.

No, there is not much here in the way of history, either folk or political. This book is really something quite different. It is sometimes an appeal, sometimes a defense, and again a defiance, a demand, and a promise—and possibly even a threat—and as all of these it often rings with a bitter and stinging eloquence. It might, in still another sense, be taken as a manifesto that Uncle Tom is finally dead and buried, and that the New Negro, or the Embattled Negro, has arrived, and stands now at his Lexington Green or at his Concord Bridge. What Mr. Wright has to say here is the defiant promise that the Negro, despite all the burdens and humiliations that have been laid upon him, is determined to take what he regards as his proper place in the American scene. Mr. Wright declares: "We are with the new tide. . . . Voices are speaking. Men are moving! And we shall be with them! . . . We are crossing the line you dared us to cross, though we pay in the coin of death!" Some people may object that the promise is too defiant, too much like a threat, the tone too clamorous, to be effective. But it will doubtless be useful for the Negro to acquire a reputation for being clamorous, and even noisy; he has been humble and docile too long; to be noisy is quite probably the only way to be heard.

The numerous photographs, with the exception of half a dozen from other sources, were selected by Mr. Rosskam from the already famous collection of the Farm Security Administration, which of course is the same thing as saying that they are excellent.

CHARLES CURTIS MUNZ

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DANCE

Ballet Theater

THE Ballet Theater, now appearing at the Forty-fourth Street Theater, provides entertainment that is particularly appealing these days, for it negates the outside world by gracefully ignoring its existence and has nothing whatever to do with issues of vital concern to any of us. The repertoire, which contains some classic and some modern works, is interesting and varied. I particularly liked Fokine's "Bluebeard" despite the initial prejudice caused by the program note. After wasting the entire intermission in the attempt to unravel its perplexing confusions, I found, when the curtain went up, that the ballet was beautifully clear. The dancing, like the Offenbach music, has abundant unpretentious gaiety. Markova is extraordinarily good in a role not particularly suited to her talents, and Anton Dolin gives the only performance I liked of the four programs on which I saw him. "The Wayward Daughter" and "Beloved," both by Nijinska, who in "Les Noces" created one of the few great ballets of modern times, were disappointing, for they lacked the characteristic originality and economy of her style. There were, however, compensatory high spots—the dancing of Ian Gibson as Alain, a sort of idiot butterfly catcher who weaves a surrealist pattern through a sturdy, rustic ballet, and that of Baronova and Markova in the title parts. Agnes de Mille's "Three Virgins and a Devil" is a bright, brisk little number, distinguished by the De Mille wit, economy, and pointed line. One of the most promising of the younger choreographers, she uses the medium with refreshing freedom from stereotypes. The performances of "Les Sylphides" and "Swan Lake" were beautiful, affording brilliant opportunities to see Baronova and Markova at their best.

Markova is the only ballerina I have seen who actually is what the ballet technique ideally aims to achieve. Her timing, elevation, and legato are unique. It is as though the air were her natural element, as though no effort were involved in the most difficult of technical feats. Baronova, too, is extraordinary, but for different reasons. Her range is tremendous, her spinning pirouettes on the points are breath-taking, and her whole technique has an incisiveness that cuts through space like a sharply pointed blade. The excellence of these two ballerinas, unfortunately, is not matched by a single male dancer in the company.

If the Ballet Theater and the other two companies which composed the original Ballet Russe de Monte Carlo should merge again into a single unit next season, the Ballet Theater would have much to contribute to the enterprise.

VIRGINIA MISHNUN

DRAMA

Gas Station and Juke Box

PLAYS by Sophie Treadwell have been reaching Broadway from time to time since at least as far back as the early twenties. They have generally been serious in intention, and they have generally been received by commentators with a certain seriousness. But not one, I think, ever aroused much genuine enthusiasm, and I doubt if any ever achieved a financial success. Now the Theater Guild has produced another, called "Hope for a Harvest," at the Guild Theater, and I am afraid that the verdict will have to be the familiar one. The theme is "important" without being too hackneyed; the treatment is intelligent and perceptive; the dialogue is adequately pointed. Yet the interest is too scattered and the impact never heavy enough to make the whole memorable.

The story is concerned with a young widow who comes back from long residence in Paris to a Western farming community and the people with whom she had grown up. But the simple and sturdy way of life to which she had hoped to return has disappeared. Bankrupt farmers who complain that it is impossible to make a living, nevertheless buy automobiles and refrigerators on credit. The gas station before which passes a continuous procession of Okies and the cheap road house in which the sons and daughters of pioneers now gather to dance to the music of the juke box have become the central institutions in a community which has lost faith in productive labor and is concerned only with acquiring imitation luxuries on credit. The heroine sets herself the task of discovering the cause and cure of the disease and undertakes the experiment of attempting to reestablish as a self-sustaining unit an abandoned farm which she had known in her childhood. The play ends with the experiment well begun and with one convert made to her theory that those who are willing to work hard for small returns can still lead a real life on the land.

Perhaps this brief outline will itself suggest one of the chief weaknesses of the play—namely, its attempt to solve a very large and real problem in terms of a very slight and theatrical fable. The background described is so palpably genuine and the story so palpably fictitious that the two never seem to exist on the same plane, and one cannot accord to the romance the kind of belief which one must accord to the whole if the problem is to seem important.

There are, unfortunately, other defects as well. Miss Treadwell has introduced a sub-plot involving a love affair between the son of a hard-working Italian farmer and the daughter of the gas-station proprietor. The intention is obviously to supply more dramatic action, and the excuse is obviously that the two stories are related through the fact that the young girl's road-house past, which nearly wrecks the romance, was itself possible only because her parents had lost their place in the society to which they had been born. But there is a sound rule about sub-plots, which is that they are likely to throw the whole play out of balance if they are based upon materials more easily, simply, and primarily dramatic than those of the main action. And that is exactly what happens here. Seduction, illegitimate pregnancy, and premarital confessions are more hackneyed as well as possibly less important than farm economics and the dignity of labor. But they are also more immediately and more sensationally interesting, and they must be handled with caution if they are to be kept subordinate. Miss Treadwell throws caution to the winds, with the result that most of the audience no doubt found the scene in which the young Italian is forced to decide whether or not he will marry a girl carrying another man's child the most interesting in the play. But that means also that this same audience found it all the more difficult to concern itself deeply with the main theme. Florence Eldridge and Fredric March play with obvious sincerity, but they hardly succeed in holding the play together. It radiates from a center and an interesting one at that; but it does not converge toward any very impressive point.

I found myself having a better time at "Sons o' Fun" (Winter Garden) than I did at its predecessor, "Hellzapoppin." Since enjoyment of the particular mixture of noise, insanity, and practical joking invented by the Messrs. Olsen and Johnson can hardly be the result of a cultivated taste, I can only conclude

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that the new show is better than the old one. The producers have added a star in the person of Carmen Miranda and appropriately raised the level of scenery, costuming, and dancing in the revue portions of the performance far above the strictly provincial level upon which all such proceedings were conducted in "Hellzapoppin," but the backbone of the entertainment is of precisely the same kind. If you go early you will be forced to proceed to your seat via the stage and to entertain even earlier comers by making your way through a series of embarrassing devices borrowed from the Coney Island "Fun House." If you do not arrive until 8:30 you will still be in time for a riot which begins with a one-man welcoming committee ready to recite statistics about your home town and which lasts until about 11:30. An entranced spectator just behind me exclaimed audibly, "I don't see how they think of all these things," but I suspect that the secret of the proprietors' success lies less in brain work than in an infinite capacity for taking pains—which is to say in a willingness to work out simple practical jokes with a mechanical elaborateness never previously attempted in the history of the world. I can only add that the show will be liked by those who like that sort of thing. Neither Aristotle, Diderot, nor the "Hamburgische Dramaturgie" will help you to decide whether you ought to like it or not, and I don't think Brunetière's "Law of the Theater" would throw much light on the subject either.

JOSEPH WOOD KRUTCH

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Bach: Chorale-Prelude "Das alte Jahr vergangen ist," with "Liebster Jesu, wir sind hier" and the Benedictus from Lassus's Mass "Douce Memoire"; Gustave Bret, Dijon Cathedral Choir; V 13498, $1. Italian Concerto; Artur Schnabel; V Set 806, $2.50. Suite No. 3; Weingartner and Paris Conservatory Orchestra; C Set 428, $3.50. Suites Nos. 1 and 6 for solo 'cello —not for the music but for Casals's phrasing; V Set 742, $7.50.

Beethoven: Quartet Op. 131; Budapest Quartet; C Set 429, $5.50. Quartet Op 18 No. 1; Budapest Quartet; C Set 444, $4.50. Symphony No. 3 ("Eroica"); Toscanini and N. B. C. Symphony (badly recorded); V Set 765, $7. Missa Solemnis—the work, not the performance of Koussevitzky with Boston Symphony, chorus and soloists (not well recorded); V Sets 758/9, $13.

Brahms: Songs; Kipnis; V Set 751, $6.50. Songs; Lehmann (recording rattly and gritty on wide-range machine); C Set 453, $4.

Chabrier: Scherzo-Valse; Casadesus; C 71061-D, $1. "Espana"; Beecham and London Philharmonic; C 71250-D, $1.

Chopin: Barcarolle; Gieseking; C 71026-D, $1.

Copland: Music for the Theater; Hanson and Eastman-Rochester Symphony; V Set 744, $3.50.

Dvorak: "Carneval" Overture; Talich and Czech Philharmonic; V 13710, $1.

Corelli: "La Folia"; Szigeti; C Set X-202, $2.50.

Enesco: Rumanian Rhapsodies Nos. 1 and 2; Ormandy and Philadelphia Orchestra, Kindler and National Symphony; V Set 830, $2.50.

Gay-Pepusch: "The Beggar's Opera"; English artists under Mudie; V Set 772, $6.50.

Gluck: "Ah, malgré moi" and "Non, ce n'est point un sacrifice" from "Alceste"; Bampton; V 18218, $1.

Handel: Concerti Grossi Op 6 Nos. 1 and 5; Diener and Collegium Musicum; V Set 808, $4.50. Suite from "The Faithful Shepherd" (arranged by Beecham); Beecham and London Philharmonic; C Set 458, $3.50.

Italian Songs of the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries; Pinza; V Set 766, $3.50.

Mahler: Symphony No. 9; Walter and Vienna Philharmonic; V Set 726, $10.50. Symphony No. 1; Mitropoulos and Minneapolis Symphony; C Set 469, $6.50.

Mozart: "Cosi fan Tutte"; Glyndebourne Festival Company; V Sets 812/3/4, $21.50. Symphony 543; Beecham and London Philharmonic; C Set 456, $3.50. Symphonies K. 201 and 338; Koussevitzky and Boston Symphony (harshly recorded); V Set 795, $5. Quartet K. 421; Budapest Quartet (recording afflicted with rattles and grit); C Set 462, $3.50. Quartet K. 458; Budapest Quartet (recording slightly sharp); V Set 763, $3.50. "Eine kleine Nachtmusik"; Weingartner and London Symphony; C Set X-187, $2.50. Piano Sonatas K. 332 and 576—the works rather than the performances by Casadesus (recording occasionally unclear and rattly); C Set 443, $3.50.

Scarlatti: Sonatas Longo Nos. 8 and 487, with Couperin's "La tendre Nanette" and Daquin's "L'Hirondelle"; Novaes; C 17229-D, $.75.

Schubert: Seven more songs from "Die Winterreise": Nos. 1, 2, 6, 7, 10, 11, 16; Lehmann (recording occasionally gritty and crackling); C Set 466, $3.50.

Schumann: Piano Quintet; Sanroma and Primrose Quartet; V Set 736, $4.

Strauss: "Don Quixote"; Ormandy with Philadelphia Orchestra and Feuermann; V Set 720, $5.50.

Tchaikovsky: Symphony No. 5; Beecham and London Philharmonic; C Set 470, $5.50. Symphony No. 6 ("Pathétique"); Furtwängler and Berlin Philharmonic; V Set 553, $6.50.

Tinayre Recital of Sacred and Secular Music of the Twelfth to the Seventeenth Centuries; C Set 431, $4.50.

Verdi: Requiem; Serafin and Rome Opera orchestra, chorus and soloists; V Set 734, $10.50. "Ingemisco" from Requiem; Bjoerling; V 13588, $1. Preludes to Acts 1 and 3 of "La Traviata"; Toscanini and N. B. C. Symphony (harshly recorded); V 18080, $1.

Wagner: Prelude and Finale of "Tristan und Isolde"; Furtwängler and Berlin Philharmonic; V Set 653, $2.50. Prelude and Good Friday Spell of "Parsifal"; Furtwängler and Berlin Philharmonic; V Set 514, $3.50. Prelude to "Die Meistersinger"; Stokowski and Philadelphia Orchestra (performance overemphatic); V Set 731, $2.50.

Williams: Fantasia on a theme of Tallis; Boult and B. B. C. Symphony; V Set 769, $2.50.

Wolf: Mignon's song "Kennst du das Land?"; Thorborg; V 18079, $1.

JAZZ: REISSUES

Benny Goodman Orchestra (1933-4): "Moonglow; C 35839.

Duke Ellington Orchestra (1932): "Lazy Rhapsody"; C 35834.

Louis Armstrong (1929): "Mahogany Hall Stomp"; C 35879.

Bix Beiderbecke: "Jazz Me Blues"; C 36156.

Red Norvo Swing Octet (1935): "Blues in E flat"; C 36158.

Teddy Wilson (1935): "What a Little Moonlight Can Do"; C 36206.

Frank Teschmaker: "Shim-Me-Sha-Wabble"; C 35953.

Mildred Bailey-Teddy Wilson: "Willow Tree"; D 18108.

Gene Krupa Chicagoans: "Blues of Israel"; D 18114.

New Orleans Rhythm Kings (1925): "Everybody Loves Somebody Blues"; B 10956.

JAZZ: NEW ISSUES

Duke Ellington Orchestra: "Jump for Joy"; V 27517.

Count Basie Orchestra: "Goin' to Chicago Blues"; O 6244.

Sidney Bechet Orchestra: "When It's Sleepy Time Down South" and "I Ain't Gonna Give Nobody None of This Jelly Roll"; V 27447.

Ellington-Blanton: "Mr. J. B. Blues"; V 27406.

Rex Stewart Orchestra: "Without a Song" and "My Sunday Gal"; B 10946.

Benny Goodman Sextet: "As Long As I Live"; C 35901.

Bud Freeman Chicagoans: "At the Jazz Band Ball," "Jack Hits the Road," "That Da-Da Strain," "Forty-Seventh and State," "Shim-Me-Sha-Wabble'; C C-40.

Eddie Condon Chicagoans: "Pretty Doll" and "Oh, Sister Ain't That Hot"; CM 535. "Georgia Grind" and "Dancing Fool"; CM 536.

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Letters to the Editors

In Defense of Finland

Dear Sirs: I. F. Stone, usually so reliable, has "fumbled" badly in his recent article "Fumbles for Finland" (*Nation,* November 15, 1941). He wrote at length about the failure of the Finnish government to answer the demands of Welles and Hull but failed completely to point out that Finnish Minister Procopé also asked some questions: First, in view of Finland's experience with the Soviet Union in 1939, what guaranties would Great Britain or the United States offer Finland that any peace treaty which the Soviet Union might now be disposed to negotiate would be maintained? Second, what assurance would Finland be given that in the event Germany was defeated and the Soviet Union became the predominant military power Russia would respect any promise which Great Britain or the United States might have made and would not again undertake to deprive the Finnish people of their independence?

The answer of Under Secretary Welles to these vital questions was neither adequate nor reassuring: "These questions . . . I was not prepared to discuss." Secretary of State Hull, in his talks with Procopé on October 3, preferred to deal only with a potential Nazi threat to Finnish independence and clearly disliked discussion of past, present, and future Russian designs on Finland. The Finns can scarcely be blamed for considering that a separate peace with Russia would not in any way safeguard the security of Finland, especially since neither England nor the United States was willing to guarantee that Russian attacks would not be renewed.

Mr. Stone, like the Russians, Churchill, and the American State Department, speaks only of the "territorial compensations" offered by Russia. Does the term cover the naval base of Hangoe, the outer islands in the Gulf of Finland, or the Fisher Peninsula, all of which are still under Russian control? The very ambiguity of the proposals smacks of insincerity.

Finland's foreign policy, in Mr. Stone's opinion, should be determined by the interests of London and Washington rather than Helsinki. I do not subscribe to that view. Finnish foreign policy should serve and is serving the interests of Finland. These interests demand a favorable military situation vis-a-vis Russia until the return of peace and collective security; they demand, further, the military occupation of eastern Karelia, whence time and time again the Russians have launched attacks upon Finland.

It is preposterous for Americans to try to persuade the Finns that Hitler rather than Stalin is their chief enemy. The lesson of history from the ninth century to 1941 is crystal-clear: the threat to Finnish freedom has always been Russia, czarist or communist. It may be that Hitler is contemplating the reduction of Finland to the status of vassal, but the realistic Finns prefer to deal today with a known and immediate enemy and cross the Nazi bridge when they get to it. Mr. Stone would do well to read a little in Finnish history; it might have a steadying effect upon his evaluation of Russo-Finnish relations.

Finally, Mr. Stone suggests an appeal to the democratic and Social Democratic elements in Finland, insinuating that these groups are suspicious of and lukewarm to the government's present foreign policy. I defy Mr. Stone to produce evidence of disaffection in Finland. Has he read the recent utterances of the leader of the Social Democratic Party? Has he been reading the party's official journal, *Sosialidemokraati?* My contacts with Finnish public opinion convey a totally different impression from Mr. Stone's.

I sincerely admired Mr. Stone's work on Alcoa. Perhaps that is his field.

JOHN I. KOLEHMAINEN

Tiffin, Ohio, December 4

A Tribute to "Nevvy"

Dear Sirs: A true gentleman, Henry Woodd Nevinson, has passed on. He always asked me, "And how is *The Nation* and its fine staff?"

It was during the Washington conference of 1921 and *grâce à* H. G. Wells that I first met Mr. Nevinson, or "Nevvy" as all literary London lovingly called him. I was in Washington with the late James Eads How, asking Senators to serve on a committee which we had organized to hold a "Conference of the Unemployed Themselves." It was an attempt to solve the problem of the six million people that were workless at that time.

No one was too important or unobtainable for us to approach. Mr. Wells was then in Washington for the conference. "Try him," said one of our adherents. So we asked Mr. Wells to come with us to Detroit to "speak to the American workers." He said that he wouldn't know what to say, but, he added, "Go and see Nevinson. He's your boy." We went, and from that day to the day of his death Nevvy and I had a beautiful and rare friendship. The last time I saw him was in London in 1936. I dined with him and his clever wife, Evelyn Sharp, in his pretty Hampstead home outside London. He asked about America and particularly about his favorite weekly, *The Nation.*

His last letter came some months ago. The pretty home in Hampstead had been bombed. This is what he wrote:

> I am sure that I have written to you since we were blasted out of our house last October—all windows gone, little roof left, walls standing but very shaky. We stuck it for some weeks, but then the noise and cold became intolerable, and since then we have lived as wandering exiles. It is horrible to live cut off from all our interests, our home, and few surviving friends. But there was no alternative, now that I am incredibly old and cannot walk or ride. Age has ended my life as war correspondent, and I must just live out my few remaining days, uprooted and unknown. In this very beautiful ancient village [Chipping Campden Gloucestershire, where he died] the exile is comfortable but intolerable. I still write a good deal and address an occasional village audience, but "where is the life that late I led" as your Pistol said? I am president of one big society, ex-president of another, and on the council of a third. All must now be given up, for the journey from here to London is difficult, and expensive. I suppose I shall be buried here soon, and nothing to mark my existence except a few almost forgotten wars. Still, I have had a fine long life, and I've seen a good deal of the world. My chief regret is that I shall never see Greece again. How astonishingly well the Greeks have been doing! How different from their ways when I went out to fight for them with the British Legion forty-four years ago, and they taught me the art of daily retreat! And today comes the great news that Yugoslavia is standing for freedom. . . . Oh, that I were twenty years younger again! I should not be sitting in a hotel. . . .

Nevvy was so wise. He knew men and events. He knew that self-interest moves most of us, but he would pass

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that over, heave a little sigh, and go right on loving humanity. He was a curiously modest man and shy. Any honor that was paid him always astonished him. Thank heaven, that he lived for so long to give so much contentment to all who knew him.

PEGGY TUCKER

New York, November 25

It All Depends

Dear Sirs: A correspondent in *The Nation* for October 25 suggests that if the Roman Catholic church really stands for religious freedom it should not insist on a monopoly of religion in Franco's Spain. It is safe to say, however, that it will not renounce that privilege, for did not the great St. Augustine say, "When error prevails, it is right to invoke liberty of conscience; but when on the contrary truth predominates, it is proper to use coercion"?

This was paraphrased by Macaulay in his essay on Sir James Mackintosh: "I am in the right, you are in the wrong. When you are stronger, you ought to tolerate me, for it is your duty to tolerate truth. But when I am stronger, I shall persecute you, for it is my duty to persecute error."

How can it be logically expected that an institution, religious or secular, which feels it has the key to all final, absolute truth will practice religious or intellectual freedom? The rule of such an institution will always be: "Error is intolerable and must be stamped out."

H. C. DEKKER

Portland, Ore., November 24

Federation Is Necessary

Dear Sirs: After reading the article by Norman Angell in *The Nation* of November 15 I arrived at the opposite conclusion from that suggested by his title, Federation Is Not Enough. If I understood his article correctly, he suggested that the world's post-war problems will not be solved primarily by some league, federation, or pact but rather by an attitude of mind which will make nations willing to go to the aid of any and every victim of aggression.

I wish to point out that in 1815 and 1919 there existed an attitude of mind favoring collective action against aggressors. In 1814 diplomatic congresses were instituted to implement that attitude; and in 1919 the League of Nations was created for the same reason. Both were found inadequate although the attitude of mind existed. I will, however, agree that because of the weakness of the instruments the anti-aggressor attitude gradually disappeared later.

These observations lead to the conclusion that we shall need more than an attitude of mind. What we shall need is a stronger world organization to implement that attitude. We have tried congresses and leagues and found them insufficient. We have likewise tried federation in the United States, Switzerland, Germany, Canada, and Australia and found it successful. I think it is clear that we must have federation after this war.

Only by abolishing national armies and creating a world police force can you prolong the attitude of mind beyond the memory of the horrors of the preceding war. And you cannot abolish national armies and create the police force without federation. Once the nation has lost its own armed forces, it will always be eager to utilize instantaneous collective action against an aggressor.

LYNN M. CASE

University, La., November 29

Propaganda

Doctor Goebbels
Prescribes labels
To make trouble
Via cable
Rousing rabbles
By his libels
On the tribal
Folk whose Bible
Makes rebuttal
Which would scuttle
All such fables
As mere bubbles
Of that addle-
Pated Goebbels

JAMES WATERMAN WISE

New York, November 14

This War Comes to You Through the Courtesy of . . .

Dear Sirs: Our economic endeavors are swiftly being shifted from the good old peace-time goals to a concentration on To-hell-with-Hitler; yet it seems that radio rabble-rousing is still proceeding on the ballyhoo-as-usual basis: namely, no distinction is made between the program plugging a scented soap and one designed to "make me glad I'm an American."

For more than three centuries our nation has developed by virtue of numerous heroic men and women, and in their deeds are to be found inspiration. But the life of George Jessel, which I heard dramatized recently on a program sponsored by a department of the federal government, does not make me glad I'm an American. Our history could be portrayed through NBC-CBS-MBS mikes, but the present pattern is merely to take a star-studded program, throw in patriotic songs of dubious quality, have the saccharine-voiced announcer croon "Liberty is lovely folks so be sure to buy three packages tomorrow," and mention that some Hollywooder, who so graciously gave his or her time, is soon to be shown in a new flicker, which, you must know, is even better than the previous one.

If Hollywood is going to run the war, then have it send back all those battleships and airplanes it has been using in patriotic films. That would be a constructive contribution.

MARTIN M. CLINTON

Indianapolis, Ind., November 29

CONTRIBUTORS

GUNNAR LEISTIKOW, former foreign editor, columnist, and editorial writer of the *Social-Demokraten* of Copenhagen, is now in the United States actively participating in the Free Denmark movement.

HUGO FERNANDEZ ARTUCIO, formerly professor of philosophy at the University of Montevideo, exposed the plot for a Nazi coup in Uruguay last spring.

CLEMENT GREENBERG contributes critical articles on literature and art to the *Partisan Review*.

NORMAN ANGELL, a member of *The Nation's* Board of Contributing Editors, won the Nobel peace prize in 1933. He is the author of "The Great Illusion," "Why Freedom Matters," and many other books.

CHARLES CURTIS MUNZ, author of "Land Without Moses," has made a close study of racial and economic problems in the South.

INFORMATION FOR SUBSCRIBERS

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